

Turning the Virtual Tables: Government Strategies for Addressing Online Opposition with an Application to Russia

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Abstract

The internet and social media – once a great hope for online activists from autocratic countries to obtain a platform where they could counter state propaganda in traditional media – are no longer safe heavens for alternative opinions as governments are increasingly as assertive and comfortable there as activists. We introduce a novel classification of strategies employed by autocrats to combat online opposition generally, and opposition on social media in particular. Our classification distinguishes both online from offline responses and censorship from engaging in opinion formation. For each of the three options – offline action, technical restrictions on access to content, and online engagement – we provide a detailed account for the evolution of Russian government strategy since 2000. In addition, for online engagement option we construct the tools for detecting such

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activity on Twitter and test them on a large dataset of politically relevant Twitter data from Russia, gathered over a year and a half. We make preliminary conclusions about the prevalence of “bots” in the Russian political Twittersphere.

1 Introduction

On December 3rd, 2014, the Russian news website *Meduza.io* reported that the 100th mirror of another Russian news website, *Grani.ru*, had been banned by the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (*Roskomnadzor*). *Grani.ru* was a popular news website with extensive coverage of opposition activity and alternative opinions. It was blocked in the Spring of 2014, at the height of Russian-Ukrainian conflict, using a technical system developed by *Roskomnadzor* to block content deemed as extremist, as allowed under Russian law. *Meduza.io* itself is a new Russian media outlet, established in the neighboring Baltic state of Latvia by Galina Timchenko, who had been dismissed as the editor-in-chief of the most popular Russian news website *Lenta.ru* over coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and moved to Latvia along with most of *Lenta.ru*'s editorial staff. Around the same time, one of the most popular political blogs in Russia, belonging to the Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny, was also permanently banned on the “LiveJournal” platform, and in early 2015 authorities began to crack down on its mirrors too.

While one might expect this sort of response in Russia, it has not always been the case. As late as 2010, a report of the *Internet in Russian Society* program at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University noted that “the political blogosphere appears to remain a free and open space for Russians of all political stripes to discuss politics, criticize or support government, fight corrupt practices and officials, and to mobilize others around political and social causes” (Etling et al. 2010). Moreover, as recently as 2009 the newly elected Russian president Dmitry Medvedev opened his own blog at LiveJournal and subsequently established a presence on Twitter and Facebook, as did many of his aides. Accordingly, the pro-government youth movements, which were created to confront possible “colored revolutions” on the streets of Moscow, were charged with the duty of competing with oppositional voices in the cyberspace and promoting government-friendly content (Kelly et al. 2012). In some cases they had even engaged directly with leading oppositional bloggers on the pressing

issues of the day. In more recent years we have also witnessed a widespread proliferation of pro-government bots in the Russian Twittersphere as well as the notorious “troll factory” in St. Petersburg documented in the pages of the *New York Times*.¹

Why were the changes in policy so quick and dramatic? What is the menu of options the government can choose from to respond to emerging online challenges? Might a different country (or leader) have responded differently? The goal of this article is to (1) argue that these are indeed important questions for political science research to address; (2) introduce an organizational framework for doing so, and (3) provide a proof of concept that we can employ digital forensic techniques to both identify and analyze a particular form of online response to opposition by governments: the use of automated accounts on Twitter known as “bots”. Accordingly, we begin by presenting a classification system for different forms of government response to online opposition. We suggest there are essentially three types of options for governments: offline responses, which include legal action and market regulation in addition to more traditional forms of (physical) intimidation; online infrastructure responses, which rely on digital tools to filter the information available to end users; and direct online engagement with users that aims to shape online conversations, usually through content generation; in all cases we provide empirical examples of how governments have utilized these strategies. As an illustration of the utility of this framework we provide a detailed case study in the appendix – and summarized in the text – of the evolution of Internet policies in Russia during Putin’s first term in office (2000-2008), the Medvedev’s interregnum (2008-2012), and the period of time since Putin’s return to the Kremlin after 2012. In particular, we investigate why the government almost completely ignored the Internet when it was actively imposing its will on traditional media and why this policy changed after Putin left the Kremlin in 2008. We also look at why, during Medvedev’s presidency, online engagement rather than imposing heavy restrictions was chosen as a primary strategy and why this choice was reversed when Putin and Medvedev switched offices in 2012.

¹Adrian Chen, “The Agency,” *The New York Times*, June 2, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html>.

In the second half of the paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of trying to identify attempts by governments to utilize the third strategy of *online engagement*. More specifically, we apply digital forensic techniques to identify “bots”, or automated (machine controlled) accounts, in the Russian political Twittersphere.² We introduce a new, exhaustive framework for classifying Twitter accounts as official accounts, bots, cyborgs, human accounts, or spam, plus sub-categories for bots and humans. We demonstrate five different techniques for identifying bots, which prove remarkably adept at finding bots in a collection of politically-relevant Twitter data. These techniques also helped us to locate bots with highly ideologically charged content.

Although this empirical work is largely intended to function as a proof of concept analysis, our initial hand-coding of a small number of accounts identified by our bot-detection methods suggests one interesting finding that warrants further investigation. For the accounts we can identify as politically oriented bots, only slightly more than half of them appear to have a pro-government orientation; we also find evidence of both pro-opposition and pro-Ukrainian bot activity. This suggests that simply assuming all political bots are pro-government – and therefore part of a government strategy for online engagement – in an analysis of this type would be a mistake.

2 Literature

Various forms of government reaction to online activities have been the subject of intensive research in recent years. This literature covers everything from legal regulation of the Internet in world’s most advanced democracies (Giacomello 2008; Travis 2013) to online censorship tools used by different types of autocratic governments around the world (Ko, Lee, and Jang 2009; MacKinnon 2011; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Nabi 2013) to establishing an active presence of governments on social media platforms (Barash and Kelly 2012; Pearce 2014).

²We draw upon a collection of 28 million tweets collected using key-word filtering over a year and a half period (November 25, 2013 - July 13, 2015) during a particularly tumultuous period in recent Russian history including the Sochi Olympics, the Euromaidan uprising in Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of Crimea and Russian involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine.

Freedom House even produces an annual international index of Internet freedom (Freedom House 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). However, few studies attempt to provide a framework for the systematic analysis of government behavior on the web that would allow us to analyze why particular tools are chosen under any given circumstances, or even what makes up the choice set in the first place.

Notable exceptions are Deibert et al. (2011), Morozov (2011) and Roberts (2014). Deibert et al. (2011) provide a historical framework, which traces the evolution of state-web relationships from initial *laissez-faire* non-involvement (until 2000) to attempts to either deny altogether (2000-2005) or carefully control access to cyberspace (2005-2010) all the way to the current (after 2010) stage of active contestation between state and corporate censors on the one hand, and cyber-activists on the other. This framework is meaningful to describe global trends, but is not closely followed in that order by each particular country. As we shall see, the Russian government turned to access denial only after it tried and failed both (in Deibert’s terms) control and contestation. In addition, while they provide many relevant examples of the ways government tried to deny or control access online, they do not provide any systematic classification of the types of action the state may take. Roberts (2014) does provide such a classification, but distinguishes between the effects (fear to speak or to listen and either friction or flooding as impediments for access) rather than the tools employed. Indeed the same tools could lead to both flooding and fear, and different kinds of tools – online and offline – could be used to increase friction.

Morozov (2011) does distinguish between technological and what he calls “sociopolitical” means of controlling online activity, the latter combining technology with online and offline actions by humans.³ He hypothesizes that if “liberation technologies”, such as those promoted by Diamond (2010), were to succeed, embattled governments could turn to potentially more

³Technological responses include Internet-filtering, which spans from targeted bans of particular webs-sites and keywords to larger national-level schemes to block entire segments of the Internet (China) or – in the extreme – any outside Internet access outside the country (North Korea). Sociopolitical responses range even more widely from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks to employing both automated bots and paid trolls to destroy online communities’ social capital to physical attacks on bloggers.

violent methods such as smearing campaigns, criminal prosecutions or even physical attacks on bloggers.(Morozov 2011, 63).

Morozov’s classification is useful for studying the dangers and promises of “liberation technologies” (what makes sociopolitical response different is exactly being beyond the reach of these technologies), but it does not fully distinguish between government actions that restrict, or otherwise structure, online media environments and those where the government actively engages in shaping the formation of opinions online. This distinction is important for at least three reasons. First, while in *censoring* online media the government could build on strategies from long before the Internet was created, online *propaganda* in distributed networks is fundamentally different from a top-down broadcasting of the party line through hierarchical monopolies of traditional media. Second, this part of the government response is experienced differently by users: not as an outcome (e.g., an inaccessible web page), but as a point of interaction with the state (e.g., a paid pro-government troll replying to your tweet). Last but not least, the study of government online activities will increasingly focus on social media, which is simultaneously the most abundant and versatile data source and the key point of contestation between the government and civil society (Deibert et al. 2011; Etling, Roberts, and Faris 2014; Pearce 2014; Lange 2014; Gunitsky 2015; Munger et al. 2015). Since social media data capture exactly the moment of interaction between the user and the state, it is important to understand the place of government action leading to this interaction in the wider menu of options available to the government.

Therefore, we propose a new classification of government options for responding to independent online activity. In addition to differentiating between “**offline**” and “**online**” tools, it distinguishes between online tools aimed merely at restricting the flow of information and those entailing active engagement with the users on behalf of the government. While the former operates largely – although not exclusively – through exerting control over Internet infrastructure, the latter typically involves some content generation. Since users experience each of these possible government actions differently, our classification, effectively, dissects

government options *from the user's point of view*. In the next section we discuss each option in detail, providing examples and identifying the key resources needed to employ each of these options.

3 A classification system for government responses to online opposition

In this section, we introduce our tripartite system for classifying government responses to online opposition. We begin with *offline response*, which primarily refers to changing a country's legal Internet regulations, but also includes attempts to change the ownership structure of online media and intimidate particular users. The second category encompasses various ways to technically *restrict access* to online content, from firewalls to DDoS attacks to sophisticated online censorship systems. The final category also involves online activity, but instead of focusing on restricting access to content, this tactic involves creating content to *engage* with users online.

3.1 Offline response

The first set of options at any government's disposal is based on digital age implications of traditional governing advantages: nodality ("network centrality"), organizational capacity, legal authority to enforce the law, a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the right to regulate human activity and, last but not least, the ability to expend large financial resources through taxation (see a detailed discussion in Ackland 2013, Chapter 8). The actions facilitated by these advantages could have a huge impact online, but take place offline; thus end-users either observe the consequences online after-the-fact (and, if necessary, adjust their behavior) or encounter these actions in person, but offline. The latter case, of course, applies to legal prosecution and violence against (usually, social media) users. In more favorable circumstances, users just observe the outcomes of government actions when commenting functionality is turned off by their favorite news web-sites after readers' comments become legally designated as media content, with all related legal obligations and risks on part of

media outlets hosting them.

Another option is to require popular bloggers to register with the government, making each individual blogger responsible for her own content, on par with actual commercial media outlets, as it has recently been done in Russia.⁴ As Ackland notes, such a legal designation – as well as other forms of regulating user-generated content – could be attributed by the government to either genuine or fabricated popular demand stemming from concerns over public safety or morality (Ackland 2013, 143, 145-146).

Finally, the government could attempt to change the landscape of the digital media market and alter the choice of online platforms available to users. Relying on their authority to regulate commerce, autocrats around the world designate certain companies and industries, including telecommunications, as “strategic”, upon which they start to enforce various restrictions, such as banning foreign ownership and/or investments, appointing state representatives to the board, etc. For example, in late 2013 the publicly-owned – but heretofore relatively independent editorially (especially, in its popular social media operations) – major Russian news agency *RIA Novosti* was stripped of its leadership, restructured, renamed, and put under the leadership of a fervent regime supporter.⁵ Nevertheless, in order to ensure the complete control of this already loyal news outlet, in early 2014 it was included in the list of “strategic enterprises”, along with the second largest Russian news agency, *ITAR-TASS*.⁶

In 2014 Russia changed its media law to ban (beginning January 1, 2016) foreign ownership (defined as more than 20%) of any media operating in Russia. In addition, any foreigner or Russian citizen with another citizenship was banned from serving as the founder or editor of

⁴Neil Macfarquhar, “Russia Quietly Tightens Reins on Web With ‘Bloggers Law,’” *The New York Times*, May 6, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/world/europe/russia-quietly-tightens-reins-on-web-with-bloggers-law.html>. See also Appendix B.3.

⁵Sergej Sumlenny, “Bad News: What Does the Closure of RIA Novosti Mean for Media in Russia?,” *Calvert Journal*, December 12, 2013, <http://calvertjournal.com/comment/show/1837/RIA-novosti-putin-russian-media-kiselyov>.

⁶Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, “RIA Novosti Begins Cutting 1/3 of Staff,” *The Moscow Times*, March 12, 2014, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ria-novosti-begins-cutting-13-of-staff/495980.html>.

any media.⁷ While this law primarily affected print media, many print publications maintain a significant presence on the web and are widely shared through social media⁸

If control over digital media is challenging or costly to legislate or order, especially in the case of private companies, then governments can use other means, in particular purchasing power and extra-legal pressure, to assume control over important Internet platforms. The so-called “Russian Google”, Yandex, sold a “golden share” to state-owned *Sberbank* in 2009, allegedly after negotiations with Dmitry Medvedev and multiple proposals to designate companies such as Yandex as “strategic”, which would have forced them to re-register in Russia⁹ and severely diminish their appeal to international capital markets.¹⁰ In 2014 Yandex founder Arkady Volozh resigned as the company’s Russian CEO.¹¹ A similar attempt was made in the case of V Kontakte, known as the “Russian Facebook”, which resulted in the hostile takeover of the company by business groups loyal to the Russian government¹² and founder and former owner and CEO Pavel Durov (and his team) fleeing the country.¹³

⁷Natalia Gulyaeva, Maria Baeva, Oxana Balayan, and Maria Sedykh, “Russia Tightens Foreign Ownership Restrictions in Media,” *Hogan Lovells Global Media and Communications Watch*, October 20, 2014, <http://www.hlmediacomms.com/2014/10/20/law-restricting-foreign-ownership-in-media-business-in-russia/>; Michael Birnbaum, “Russia’s Putin Signs Law Extending Kremlin’s Grip over Media,” *The Washington Post*, October 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russias-putin-signs-law-extending-kremlins-grip-over-media/2014/10/15/6d9e8b2c-546b-11e4-809b-8cc0a295c773_story.html.

⁸The Moscow Times, “15 Global Firms Hit by Russia’s Law Limiting Foreign Ownership of Media,” September 28, 2014, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/507968.html>.

⁹Yandex is incorporated in the Netherlands as Yandex N.V. – a fact that in 2014 was publicly condemned by Vladimir Putin at his meeting with People’s Front for Russia. See Christopher Brennan, “Putin Says CIA Created the Internet, Cites Foreign Influence at Yandex,” *The Moscow Times*, April 24, 2014, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-says-cia-created-the-internet-cites-foreign-influence-at-yandex/498903.html>.

¹⁰Nikolay Grishin, “Yandexed Everything,” *Kommersant - Trade Secret*, March 12, 2012, <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2065978>.

¹¹He kept the executive position in the international operations, though. See Nadia Beard, “Founder and CEO of Yandex, Arkady Volozh, Resigns,” *Calvert Journal*, August 26, 2014, <http://calvertjournal.com/news/show/3035/founder-of-yandex-resigns-amid-controversy-arkady-volozh>.

¹²Nikolay Kononov, “The Kremlin’s Social Media Takeover,” *The New York Times*, March 10, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/11/opinion/the-kremlins-social-media-takeover.html>; Joshua Yaffa, “Is Pavel Durov, Russia’s Zuckerberg, a Kremlin Target?,” *Bloomberg Businessweek*, August 1, 2013, <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-01/is-pavel-durov-russias-zuckerberg-a-kremlin-target>.

¹³Ingrid Lunden, “Durov, Out For Good From VK.com, Plans A Mobile Social Network Outside Russia,” *Techcrunch*, April 22, 2014, <http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/22/durov-out-for-good-from-vk-com-plans-a-mobile-social-network-outside-russia/>.

Of course, instead of attempting to take control over existing public and private media and communications platforms, the government could try to increase its influence through artificially generated competition. In several countries, including Russia and Turkey, governments reportedly allocated generous funds to the creation of “national” search engines, social networks or email services.¹⁴ A Russian national search engine has been discussed since at least 2008, and Turkey began a similar project in 2009 (Morozov 2011). The results of government investments in creating artificial competition are less than impressive, though. In late 2014, the Turkish project was still in development, with a scheduled launch in 2016¹⁵. In Russia, *Rostelecom* – the largest telecommunications company in the country, with the government as its majority shareholder – released a beta-version of the search engine “Sputnik” in May of 2014, but it has not been able to acquire a noticeable market share as of yet.

3.2 Online response: restrictions

Offline means of controlling online activity are popular among autocrats around the world, not the least because they usually require zero IT competence or resources. However, rapid growth in Internet penetration rates and the emergence of the Internet as a principal source of information for increasing numbers of people creates challenges even for autocrats who are able to successfully employ offline tools of control. To begin with, information can be produced and distributed by foreign citizens and entities that are out of reach of the autocrat’s security apparatus. Second, some local activists and/or journalists can use their digital proficiency to distribute information anonymously and therefore avoid offline prosecution. Finally, for various reasons autocrats could simply prefer putting flows of information under their control rather than going after its producers. If, for example, an autocrat wants to avoid taking responsibility for the government’s actions, a DDoS attack on a popular oppositional blog can be blamed on “unidentified” hackers, while most types of offline response require at

¹⁴In the Russian case these pleas were especially suspicious given that Russia already had a “national” search engine, social network and email service, all created without any government aid. Yandex and Vkontakte have larger market shares in Russia than Google and Facebook, respectively, an impressive result in the absence of any protectionist measures against foreign competitors.

¹⁵<http://english.yenisafak.com/news/tubitak-to-develop-national-search-engine-2024960>

least some involvement of the state apparatus.¹⁶ Thus, governments facing a serious threat from the opposition or an insurgency may try to acquire tools to exert control over Internet infrastructure and deploy such tools either routinely or in times of political instability.

Of course, there always exists the option to completely monopolize the telecommunication infrastructure inside the country and cut any connections with international networks. North Korea did just that: it maintains *Kwangmyong*, a national intranet, and a national mobile phone service *Koryolink*. The North Korean authorities have complete control over the information accessible through *Kwangmyong* and tightly monitor personal communications through *Koryolink*. Communications with the outside world through both channels are prohibited (except for the ruling elite and foreign tourists). However, such a system imposes a heavy toll on the national economy.

A step removed from this extreme approach – albeit still with non-trivial costs – is the highly sophisticated Chinese “Great Firewall”, probably the best example of blocking sensitive information without fatally hurting either government communications or commercial activity.¹⁷ This form of targeted Internet-censorship is well documented by King, Pan, and Roberts (2013), who describe the immense Chinese system of monitoring and censoring of UGC across the country’s dispersed social media platform and estimate that around 13% of all social media posts get censored.

The ability of autocratic governments to filter Internet communications is primarily a function of three factors: control over the critical infrastructure; planning ahead and implementing a long-term, comprehensive, but not overly costly solution; and financial and human resources as well as the technical expertise necessary to build filtering tools. The first component is rarely an advantage of autocratic regimes: most of the world’s Internet infrastructure (ISPs,

¹⁶Even if the attack on a blogger is carried out by private citizens, and the government claims to have no relation with them, there is a strong expectation and laws on the books that require criminal investigation in the case of violence or even threat of violence. DDoS attacks on the other hand, and cybercrime in general, remain weakly (if at all) legally regulated in most countries, and usually neither the law nor public opinion demands any action on the part of the government in the case of a cyberattack.

¹⁷The Economist, “The Art of Concealment,” April 4, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574631-chinese-screening-online-material-abroad-becoming-ever-more-sophisticated>.

search and social media platforms, transaction services, etc.) is located in advanced democracies and therefore out of reach for autocrats seeking to control them. Consequently, the latter two factors – i.e., preparedness and money – determine ultimate success. According to Howard and Hussain (2013, 71-72) “sophisticated long-term investments in managing information infrastructure” made by countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have made these countries much less vulnerable to growing discontent than Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, who have had to rely on ad hoc solutions. The key risk of the latter approach is that an abrupt shutdown of Internet access can end up hurting the government’s ability to communicate with its own allies while simultaneously provoking further unrest by interfering with non-political uses of the Internet.

Two primary technological options for regimes are filtering/blocking of particular websites or segments of the web and DDoS attacks. The former has the advantage of being permanent and customizable. China, for example, blocks only certain platforms and content (by keywords), while North Korea famously maintains its local web segment in complete isolation from the outside web. Both policies, though, share a common disadvantage of this approach: high transparency for local users and susceptibility to documentation by outsiders (including other governments, human rights organizations, etc.) (Morozov 2011).

DDoS attacks, on the other hand, are usually hardly traceable, relatively cheap, can be deployed during particularly sensitive political events such as elections or protests and can be more easily outsourced to loyal but independent groups, such as the Syrian Electronic Army.¹⁸ On the other hand, their ability to break up online communications is limited in time and web space, i.e., a small set of web-sites at best. Moreover, the most popular platforms, such as Google and Twitter, are highly protected from DDoS attacks.

The most distinctive (and important for our discussion) feature of Internet filtering is that it is observed by users as an end result and does not create any kind of interaction with

¹⁸Helmi Noman, “The Emergence of Open and Organized Pro-Government Cyber Attacks in the Middle East: The Case of the Syrian Electronic Army,” *The Information Warfare Monitor*, May 30, 2011, <http://www.infowar-monitor.net/2011/05/7349/>.

the state (or its representatives) in course of user's *activity* online. If Twitter is blocked in your country (permanently, as in China, North Korea, Iran and several other countries, or temporarily, as in Venezuela and Turkey in 2014), you either cannot get there, or you can use one of the available tools (anonimizers, proxy-servers, etc.) to restore your access. In either case, users observe government actions as end results. The impact of such actions is either in successful breaking of inter-personal communication or access to websites, or the lack thereof. In other words, the government cannot possibly shape the conversation through these means. To achieve this latter goal government has to directly engage with users online.

3.3 Online response: engagement

Establishing a government presence on the web and using it to promote the government's agenda constitutes the third and final option at a government's disposal. This type of government response actually takes place online and users encounter it in the course of their online – particularly social media – activity. Mainly, it includes the government creating content, either through automated processes or real human effort.¹⁹ The most obvious – and increasingly popular – tool employed by governments to alter political conversations on the social media is using either “bots” or real people to advocate pro-government positions, turn conversation meaningless or prohibitively divisive, or distract users from sensitive political issues altogether.

Bots can perform two key functions: cluttering conversations with “digital dust”, which could be pro-government, anti-opposition, or simply aimed at “flooding the zone” with distracting information in order to detract attention from opposition voices; or altering search results, Internet rankings, top lists and other automated tools for sorting, sharing, discovering and consuming online content. As such, bots could be used to support real people. For in-

¹⁹However, hacking and publishing bloggers' personal communications (such as emails, instant messages, etc.) could allow the government to expose and implicate the opposition and shape the conversation that way. A typical example of the latter is the case of Russian blogger and hacker *torquemada_hell*, a Russian-speaking person allegedly living in Germany. In 2010-11 he successfully hacked the email accounts of multiple Russian opposition politicians and released potentially damning information to the public. See Alexey Sidorenko, “Russia: Analysis of Hacker Attacks On Bloggers,” *Global Voices*, June 20, 2010, <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/06/20/russia-analysis-of-hacker-attacks-on-bloggers/>.

stance, a ranking of the most popular Russian blog posts, maintained by Yandex, was closed in 2009, inundated by bots promoting mostly pro-government posts.²⁰

The possible functions of humans acting on the government side are much more diverse. It is useful, therefore, to provide a basic classification of pro-government users. This classification does not look into users' honesty, consciousness and convictions. Instead, it is based on formal or informal ties with the government (or the lack of thereof).

To begin with, the government could hire students or other low-paid workers to submit rather simple messages, which would nevertheless pass the human intelligence tests integrated in many modern social media platforms. Their messages could be either identical or contain the same message worded differently. One particular example of this type of bloggers are the so-called Chinese 50-centers.²¹ Russian pro-government youth movements, such as *Nashi* and *Young Guard of United Russia* were often accused of running a similar network of 11-rublers.²² Leaks released by the Russian arm of Anonymous in 2012 indicated that Nashi paid hundreds of thousand of dollars in fees for comments, statuses, Facebook likes, Youtube dislikes, etc.²³

Cheap bloggers paid per comment are not the only group of friendly users that could be put on the government payroll. Bribing prominent and trusted bloggers, celebrities or journalists – although potentially much more expensive – could turn out to be a better investment in terms of persuading the public. The same leaks as noted in the previous paragraph revealed

²⁰Alexey Sidorenko, "Russia: Major Search Engine Closes Its Blog Rating," *Global Voices*, November 6, 2009, <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/11/06/russia-major-search-engine-closes-its-blog-rating/>. The more pressing concern for Yandex, though, was government outrage in the cases when, instead, anti-government posts got traction in the ratings, see Alexandra Odyanova, "Yandex to Close List That Annoyed State — News," *The Moscow Times*, November 6, 2009, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/yandex-to-close-list-that-annoyed-state/388969.html>.

²¹Sarah Cook, "China's Growing Army of Paid Internet Commentators," *Freedom At Issue Blog*, October 11, 2011, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/china%E2%80%99s-growing-army-paid-internet-commentators>.

²²Anton Nossik, "11 Rubles and 80 Kopecks per Comment," *Echo of Moscow*, September 10, 2013, <http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/nossik/1154616-echo/>.

²³Miriam Elder, "Hacked Emails Allege Russian Youth Group Nashi Paying Bloggers," *The Guardian*, February 7, 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/07/hacked-emails-nashi-putin-bloggers>; Miriam Elder, "Polishing Putin: Hacked Emails Suggest Dirty Tricks by Russian Youth Group," *The Guardian*, February 7, 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/07/putin-hacked-emails-russian-nashi>.

that along with paying small fees to thousands of low-skilled bloggers, Nashi also put aside tens of thousand of dollars to be paid to a small group of popular and heretofore considered independent bloggers for highly sophisticated positive publicity for the Russian leadership.²⁴

The next group consists of government supporters whose social media activity is not paid *per se*, but is facilitated through participation in various political projects or actual employment by the government. These sets of bloggers range from members of various youth political movements to the MPs from the ruling (or affiliated) parties to relatively prominent politicians (ministers, party leaders) who are encouraged to take on the challenge of representing the government's point of view in an often hostile social media environment.

Finally, the government could also try to mobilize genuine supporters with no ties – formal or informal – to the government or ruling party. Obviously, this group could include various types of people, but two groups deserve special attention. First, if famous people – particularly, celebrities and journalists – volunteer to support the government agenda, it could help the autocrat both directly and indirectly through endowing the ideas already promoted by the armies of bots and paid bloggers with the weight of fame, reputation and personal independence. Second, people in the opposition could occasionally be legitimately attracted by government policies and join the ranks of pro-government bloggers.²⁵

In the next section, we illustrate the usefulness of this taxonomy by discerning the evolution of Russian government policy regarding the Internet over the past decade and a half, or, put

²⁴Miriam Elder, “Emails Give Insight into Kremlin Youth Group’s Priorities, Means and Concerns,” *The Guardian*, February 7, 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/07/nashi-emails-insight-kremlin-groups-priorities>.

²⁵Prominent examples from recent Russian history are brief, but notable, including the excitement of previously largely oppositional nationalists about the Russian annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine. See Tom Balmforth, “From The Fringes Toward Mainstream: Russian Nationalist Broadsheet Basks In Ukraine Conflict,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, August 17, 2014, <http://www.rferl.org/content/feature/26534846.html>; Natalia Yudina, “Beware the Rise of the Russian Ultra-Right,” *The Moscow Times*, September 11, 2014, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/beware-the-rise-of-the-russian-ultra-right/506876.html>; Paul Goble, “Ukrainian Events Have Deeply Split Russian Nationalists,” *The Interpreter*, July 20, 2014, <http://www.interpretermag.com/ukrainian-events-have-deeply-split-russian-nationalists/>; Ivan Nechepurenko, “How Nationalism Came to Dominate Russia’s Political Mainstream,” *The Moscow Times*, August 3, 2014, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/how-nationalism-came-to-dominate-russia-s-political-mainstream/504495.html>.

another way, Russia in the age of Putin. This evolution proves to be not the usually discussed linear increase in the censorship efforts towards and especially during Putin's third term, but a complicated process of choosing the optimal strategy, which directly reflects both the political struggles inside the regime and the distinctive challenges associated with the implementation of each of the three options we identify.

4 Russian government online: a constantly evolving strategy²⁶

Russian government activities online gained serious international attention when they were redirected towards aiding the Russian offensive in Ukraine in the wake of the Euromaidan Revolution of 2014. The resourcefulness and inventiveness of these actions as well as their reach (that went far beyond Russian borders and even Russian-speaking world) were all the more surprising for Western observers and policy makers since until then Russian authorities were not considered to be particularly artful in their digital operations, even for domestic purposes.

However, a closer examination of the evolution of Russia's internet policy reveals that perhaps such surprise was unwarranted. While it is true that early in his tenure Putin decided for the time being to avoid almost any interference in the online media, it was not done out of ignorance or lack of attention. The Kremlin's approach to online media was from the very moment Putin came to power guided by a deliberate strategy. This strategy evolved under changing circumstances and through a long trial-and-error process, which was much more complicated than simple linear increase in the level of censorship and amount of propaganda.

Vladimir Putin is famously old-fashioned when it comes to digital tools: he rarely uses computer and never had any personal online presence, which in 2016 makes him an exception among heads of state. However, policy-wise he showed both interest in new technologies and awareness of potential government strategies regarding them. Even before he became

²⁶While this section provides an analytical summary of the Russian experience, the online Appendix B adds the necessary details on many specific cases of government interaction with online media, including evidence from the primary sources.

acting President, in late 1999 he convened the leaders of nascent Russian IT industry and online media and made a clear commitment to protect their freedom and avoid Chinese-style filtering. While it is unclear whether he was concerned with the Russian image abroad or with offsetting the damage this image suffered after he took near total control over the traditional media, his choice was politically expedient, and not without a precedent in Russian history.

At only 2% Internet penetration in 2002 (and 16% at the end of Putin's second term in 2008), online media were a medium for personal communication more than of mass persuasion and as such were hardly an asset of any political significance. Following an old Soviet tradition, Putin avoided direct interference with personal communication channels.²⁷ This resulted in an emergence of thriving and competitive internet industry, whose leading companies – Yandex and Vkontakte – have won competition over Google and Facebook, respectively, and did it without the aid of any protectionist measures, a rare achievement for any country. Years ahead of most Western countries, Russian online news media created from scratch overtook the websites of traditional media in popularity and began doing their own original reporting (instead of relying on existing offline news agencies and outlets). Meanwhile, the Russian public created a vibrant blogosphere large enough to completely overtake the major blog platform of the time, LiveJournal, which was eventually purchased by a Russian company.

As Internet penetration continued to rise steadily in the late 2000s and most traditional media became completely sanitized of any alternative opinion, online news media, most of which were rather critical of the regime, became more and more influential. However, the government first saw this as an opportunity rather than a threat.

To a large extent it was the result of a change in the government.²⁸ In 2008, freshly installed into Kremlin, Dmitry Medvedev and his team were looking for ways to build their own support base, sorely needed both to implement their modernization agenda and to get a fighting chance

²⁷However, again in line with the Soviet blueprint, an elaborate system of digital surveillance called *SORM* was established (Zasursky 2004, 181-183)

²⁸That it became one of Medvedev's government's defining policies suggests how limited was the change overall (see on limits of Medvedev's modernization Jonson and White 2012).

to stay in power for the second term. Medvedev published his modernization manifesto “Go, Russia” in online-only liberal newspaper *Gazeta.ru*. Recognizing the differences with traditional Russian media, where alternative opinions could be bought out or shut down, Medvedev and his team made a serious attempt to engage Russian online public in a genuine discussion of the country’s way forward. Both he and his aids created presence on multiple blog platforms, which earned for Medvedev the nickname “Blogger-in-Chief”.

Most crucially, they sought, received and responded to critical feedback from the audience, a practice unheard of for years in the traditional media, but required to get any attention in the vibrant Russian blogosphere at the time. Pro-government youth movements were mobilized to spread Medvedev’s message to every corner of the Russian segment of the Internet. While their activities were not without controversy (more due to corruption and incompetence than ideological zeal²⁹), even they had to engage in genuine discussion with bloggers critical of the government, thus facilitating public debate on important issues. While the government did occasionally use DDoS attacks, particularly in relation to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the Russian internet remained remarkably free (in a growing contrast with the traditional media) and the government activities there were primarily targeted to mobilize genuine support based on the compelling message and (limited) interaction with the public.

This engagement came to the abrupt end in the wake of the 2011 – 2012 Russian popular protests, which coincided with Putin’s return to Kremlin.³⁰ Putin openly expressed disdain to the “ungrateful” protesters, who benefited from the economic growth he presided over, but turned away from him. Given the role of media, and social media in particular, in coordinating and sustaining the largest and the longest wave of protests in Russia in two decades, it was also impossible for Putin to go back to “disengagement strategy” he used during his first two

²⁹Miriam Elder, “Emails Give Insight into Kremlin Youth Group’s Priorities, Means and Concerns,” *The Guardian*, February 7, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/07/nashi-emails-insight-kremlin-groups-priorities>.

³⁰According to most observers, protest, triggered by the alleged major irregularities in vote count during Duma elections, did not just coincide with Putin’s return to Kremlin, but were largely caused by the perceived undemocratic nature of the deal between Putin and Medvedev, which was announced just a few weeks before elections at the ruling party convention, and was kept secret until last minute even from the convention delegates (Sakwa 2014, 111-134).

terms in office.

Instead, Putin began to actively employ both offline means of controlling media production and online means of controlling access to it. The first included pressuring media moguls into either replacing the editorial staff of online media they owned (*Lenta.ru*, *Gazeta.ru* and *RBK* are the most prominent among dozens of examples) or into selling them to more loyal owners (Russian Forbes and *Vkontakte*). The government also adopted laws making online media liable for the content of comments posted by their readers, thus requiring these websites either to actively police user-generated content, or shut commenting tools down altogether. In addition, various laws were adopted to prosecute individual bloggers for alleged extremism and other content deemed inappropriate. Since 2012 these laws have been applied in an increasingly wide-ranging manner, punishing with large fines and real prison terms not only the original authors of messages, but also those who reposted them. Finally, many prominent bloggers and online media journalists have faced threats and (at times life-threatening) assaults, which are rarely if ever investigated.

Online tools of controlling access to content include the creation of the Russian Internet Blacklist, maintained by the dedicated government agency, *Roskomnadzor*. Blacklisting initially required a court order, but later was also allowed on a simple request from the Office of the Prosecutor General. While theoretically it is supposed to be easy to exit the blacklist (after removing the content deemed unlawful), after several prominent opposition news websites and opposition leader's blogs were blocked in March 2014, in the midst of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, they were not informed what content they would have to remove to exit the Blacklist.³¹ Instead, the government refused to respond to their requests even after they sued for an answer, and they remain blacklisted to this day, thus illustrating the ways in which formal rules and informal power relations are applied in tandem.³²

³¹Human Rights Watch, "Russia: Halt Orders to Block Online Media," March 23, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/23/russia-halt-orders-block-online-media>.

³²Global Freedom of Expression, "Grani.ru v. Office of Prosecutor General," *Columbia University*, September 2, 2014, <https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/grani-ru-vs-office-of-prosecutor-general/>.

Still, neither offline nor online tools allowed the government to shut down hostile activity online completely. While a long period of unrestricted development of domestic alternatives diminished the market share of Facebook and Google in Russia (which makes the government’s job easier, as local platforms are easier to coerce into compliance), Facebook and Google are still used by millions of Russians on a daily basis. And when Vkontakte, immediately after getting a request, removed the event page of pro-opposition rally, Facebook (after some uncertain moves) refused to comply.³³ Journalists fired by the pressured owners could move abroad and set up a news media there (as *Meduza.io* did). Therefore, the space for engagement strategy remains, but instead of playing the leading role, the government supports offline and online restrictions. Rather than trying to engage in dialog or persuade, the government simply attempts to hammer down the official message, artificially increase the indicators of its take-up (propel the politicians into the lists of top bloggers and their messages into the list of top posts), while simultaneously cluttering the communication channels used by the opposition. This created a huge demand for various troll and bot factories, which produce pro-government content in volumes, caring about the quantity much more than quality and persuasion capacity. This content requires a new set of tools to study it properly.

5 Online engagement: preliminary analysis

5.1 Introduction

Online engagement is a complex phenomenon, ranging from completely automated bots producing large volumes of gibberish in order to flood popular communication platforms to high-profile paid bloggers with independent reputations, who send nuanced, targeted messages to different groups of the public. While of course it would be useful to study all forms of this activity, for the sake of space constraints in this manuscript we limit ourselves to bots.³⁴

³³Sergei Guriev, “Facebook Faces Down Putin,” *Project Syndicate*, January 9, 2015, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/facebook-versus-putin-by-sergei-guriev-2015-01>.

³⁴We do, however, intend to greatly expand this focus in future research.

There are three main reasons for this choice. First, bots produce by far the largest volume of content, and without tools to identify (and remove) content produced by bots, studying the human-generated content only would be almost impossible. Second, the only practical way to identify bots is by using automated algorithms; starting the empirical part of our research in this manner has the advantage of therefore creating an objective and replicable approach that can be employed in future analysis. There is, however, another and less methodologically inspired reason to start with bots, which is that they are both important and interesting objects to study. While social media provide citizens and politicians with new and powerful tools for expressing their political beliefs and preferences, affecting the political agenda, mobilizing supporters, and organizing political actions, they also bring the challenge of differentiating between real political communication on the one hand, and interaction with computer programs that imitate human activity on the other.

Here we seek to identify bots in the most strict sense of the word. **Bots** are accounts that are operated by a computer program that generate account content in an automatic and predefined way.³⁵ If, on the contrary, an account is operated by a human who also uses some scripts to help herself produce account content, we label this account as a cyborg, which is an intermediate category between bots and humans. Finally, a troll who is hired to post her own tweets about a certain topic would be a **human** rather than a bot in our classification. Similarly, a real human being who does not post her own tweets, but only retweets accounts she follows, would also be classified as human rather than a bot. We discuss this classification in more detail in Section 5.4.³⁶

³⁵This could include using a set of sources, such as news feeds, other twitter accounts, search queries, or even simply a list of predefined text in a spreadsheet.

³⁶Bot detection is a relatively new topic in political science emerging from the burgeoning research in political communication on social media platforms. The scant literature that exists on the subject mostly borrows methods developed in computer science to detect email spam. Bot detection in social media is a different (but closely related) task that can be achieved with a wider range of techniques that make use of both textual and non-textual account information (Chu et al. 2012). Nevertheless, bot detection in social media is still regarded as a challenging task within the computer science community, making Boshmaf et al. (2011) claim that 80% of bots are undetectable. Here, we combine some of the existing automated bot-detection techniques with domain specific knowledge and human coding.

5.2 Data

To collect data for analysis, we used the Twitter’s Streaming API to collect a large dataset of tweets that contain specific keywords related to Russian politics. We began with a list of politically relevant keywords and hashtags (including major politicians’ names, events and slogans)³⁷ that spanned the Russian political spectrum, including Putin and United Russia, loyal and radical opposition, Russian nationalists and others. This allowed us to collect a dataset with more than 14 million tweets posted by approximately 1.3 million Twitter users who *listed Russian as their account language*, between November 25, 2013 and July 13, 2015.³⁸

The Twitter API returns both tweet-level information (i.e. text, date and time of the tweet, its language, etc.) and metadata (various characteristics of the account sending the tweet including the author’s ID and screen name, the number of followers and friends and official account language). There is a large variation in the number of tweets from different users in our collection, ranging from 1 to almost **97,000**.³⁹

5.3 Detection methods

Our approach to detecting bots and cyborgs focused on three account characteristics: the *entropy* of inter-tweeting time intervals, the *followers/friends ratio* of accounts (which produced two different methods of finding bots), and the presence of *identical tweets* in our

³⁷Politicians’ names include Putin, Medvedev, Navalny, Khodorkovsky, Udaltsov, etc. The events feature Sochi Olympics, opposition rallies at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin”, etc. We also searched for slogans like “Party of thieves and crooks”, “Sobyanin is our mayor”, “Stop feeding the Caucasus”, etc. The full list of keywords and hashtags is provided in the Appendix A.

³⁸We have data on 483 days between those dates, with the exception of two short periods: October 2 – 29, 2014 and November 6, 2014 – January 29, 2015. We stopped collecting tweets between those days for technological reasons. Our collection also includes an additional 14 million tweets from 3.3 million users who do not list Russian as their account language. We chose not to include these tweets in the current analysis because our goal here was not to characterize the entirety of bot behavior in Russian Twitter, but rather to demonstrate the feasibility of bot detection techniques in Russian twitter. Nevertheless – not surprisingly – most of these tweets are in Russian and we will incorporate this data in subsequent parts of the research project.

³⁹Around 37% of all tweets in our collection are retweets, which means the user in question shared a tweet posted by another user. However, even among the remaining 63% of the collection we were able to identify about 6.7 *million* tweets that were identical to at least one other tweet in the collection. Most of these are short and repeat just once, which might be a pure coincidence, whereas others repeat numerous times, with one tweet appearing separately **24,558** times! It contains a joke about the Olympic games in using riot police against protesters, where Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus gets Gold, Vladimir Putin of Russia gets Silver, and Viktor Yanukovich of Ukraine is banned from the competition.

collection (this has also produced two methods). Below we justify and describe each method in detail; we verify whether the accounts they recover are indeed bots in Section 5.4.

Entropy of inter-tweeting time intervals. Our first technique is predicated on the idea that bots show a much higher regularity in their activity on Twitter than human beings. This is also true for cyborgs, at least to the extent they rely on automated sourcing of content. In the most simple case, for instance, bots may be programmed to send tweets every k seconds. On the contrary, humans’ tweeting activity is much more sporadic. These differences in predictability may be captured by entropy which is a measure of uncertainty popular in computer science and information theory. In order to compute entropy, we created a list of all accounts that have at least three tweets in our collection.⁴⁰ Then, for each of these accounts, we computed the length of time intervals between consecutive tweets, and used those time intervals to compute an average entropy as follows:

$$Av. Entropy_i = \frac{1}{T_i} \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} p_t^{(i)} \times \log_2(p_t^{(i)}),$$

where p_t is the probability of interval t for account i ; T_i is the total number of time intervals for account i . The higher the value, the more unpredictable an account is. We expect that accounts with low entropy are either bots or cyborgs.

Followers/friends ratio. One concern with an entropy-based approach to bot detection in the case of a dataset acquired by selecting tweets containing particular keywords is that we could be missing activity by accounts in our collection that also tweeted on other topics. Thus our second method of detection does not depend on tweeting activity, but instead is based on the idea that bots should have fewer followers than normal human users. Indeed, most humans would probably refuse to follow a bot that does not show signs of a normal human online activity. At the same time, bots would tend to follow lots of users (in Twitter parlance, have many friends) in the hope that some of them will accidentally follow them back. Thus,

⁴⁰Since we are computing the entropy of *inter*-tweeting time intervals, we need at least two intervals to compute a meaningful entropy value, or, in other words, three tweets.

we expect that some bots will tend to have a very small followers/friends ratio defined simply as:

$$ratio_i = \frac{|\{followers_i\}|}{|\{friends_i\}|},$$

where $|\{followers_i\}|$ denotes the number of accounts that follow account i , and $|\{friends_i\}|$ stands for the number of accounts that are followed by account i .

Another interesting case includes accounts that have no friends (i.e. do not follow anybody). Obviously, the followers/friends ratio is undefined for these accounts due to division by zero, and we code them separately.

Identical tweets. Our two final bot-detection techniques involve identifying accounts sending identical tweets. There are two subtypes of identical tweets an account could send out: *intra-* and *inter-account* identical tweets. The first subtype refers to the case when an account is repeatedly sending the same tweet. We doubt that a human being would engage in such an activity, whereas a pre-programmed primitive bot could easily do that. The second subtype refers to the situation when a group of accounts are sending out identical tweets. This strategy can be employed by bots to maximize the spread of specific information over the network.

5.4 Empirical assessment of bot detection methods

We use all the methods outlined above to identify bot accounts for the subsequent verification using human coding. Doing so required setting a set of thresholds that determine how many accounts each method recovers for us to code. Similar to most cases of threshold selection, this is not a straightforward exercise since no theory has so far been developed to justify the choice. Given the lack of theory-driven guidance, we followed an empirical approach with two main considerations in mind. On the one hand, thresholds should be sufficiently loose to produce enough accounts for a meaningful verification. On the other hand, the thresholds needed to be sufficiently stringent to keep hand-coding of the recovered accounts feasible.⁴¹

⁴¹Thus, these thresholds should be considered simply a first cut in developing bot-detection methods: we check whether we can reliably identify bots if we set the thresholds at their most extreme levels keeping the sample size for coding reasonably large but feasible for hand-coding (roughly 100 accounts per method). In

For the *entropy* measure, we restricted our attention to those accounts that produced at least 300 tweets throughout the period under study. As there were more than 5,500 such accounts, we selected 100 accounts with the lowest entropy values.

A similar threshold (300+ tweets in our collection) was applied to 36,500 accounts with no friends, yielding 99 accounts.

To set the threshold for the *followers/friends ratio*, in the right panel of Figure 1 we plotted the distribution of all accounts in our dataset that have a ratio below 1 (i.e. follow more people than they are followed by). There are more than 900,000 accounts like that, or about 70% of our accounts. Among these, a disproportionately large number of accounts have a ratio around 0 (when nobody follows them) and 1 (when they are followed by the same number of accounts that they follow themselves). We expect bots to have a very low ratio and have chosen 0.01 as our threshold, thus selecting accounts that follow (at least) 100 times more accounts than they are followed by. Together with a 50+ tweets in the collection activity requirement, this method yielded 135 accounts for verification.

Lastly, 43,000 accounts in our collection tweeted the same text several times and another 600,000 tweeted text that some other accounts in our collection tweeted (distributions shown in Figure 2). We expect a large proportion of accounts engaging in such behavior to be bots. For the former category we have set the threshold at 50 repetitions, yielding 90 accounts to verify. For the latter category we set the threshold at 1,000 repetitions, which left us with 102 accounts to verify.

Thus, we end up with five sets of “suspicious” Twitter accounts (a total of 526) that we identified using different bot-detection techniques. Table 1 shows intersections of these sets. Net the 14 duplicates, we therefore proceed with an analysis of 512 accounts. The low number of accounts these sets have in common suggests that we managed to identify different kinds

future work we intend to use machine learning tools to empirically identify both the threshold levels that distinguish bots from humans and those account characteristics that are most informative for bot detection.




Figure 1: Distribution of Twitter accounts in the data set by the entropy of inter-tweeting time intervals (left panel) and followers/friends ratio (right panel)




Figure 2: Distribution of accounts sending repeated tweets

of bots that may be used for different purposes, or at the very least created using different techniques.

Table 1: Intersections of sets with suspicious accounts

	No friends	Low ratio	Entropy	Repeat themselves	Repeat others
No friends	99	0 ^a	4	2	1
Low ratio		135	0	0	0
Entropy			100	0	5
Repeat itself				90	2
Repeat others					102

Note: Entries are numbers of Twitter accounts that are common to a pair of sets.

^a “Low ratio” and “no friends” sets are mutually exclusive by definition, as ratio of followers to friends is undefined for accounts with no friends.

In order to assess the reliability of our bot-detection algorithms, we enlisted 20 coders (native Russians, undergraduate students in Political Science, and familiar with Twitter) and tasked them with classifying 512 accounts into five categories: in addition to humans, bots, and cyborgs, described above, we have two miscellaneous ones, spam and official accounts. Spam includes accounts that feature no meaningful content, and consist mostly of gibberish or consumer advertisement. Official accounts refer to the accounts run by organizations (such as media and government bodies) whose tweeting patterns are expected to be different from personal accounts. Some of these five categories were further split into subcategories. This was primarily done to reduce noise in human coding (more narrow categories are easier to define precisely for coders), and they were reaggregated at the analysis stage. With respect to bots, however, we present some interesting findings about their subtypes below. For details on coding schema, see Appendix C.

Our coders received detailed coding instructions in Russian (see Appendix XXX), and were provided with a list of 20 Twitter accounts (different from 512 accounts of interest) to code as an exercise. Next, each of them went through a 90-minutes Skype session with one of the co-authors, to ensure their clear understanding of the coding schema. We then randomly split coders into 4 groups of 5 people, and randomly assigned different Twitter accounts of interest

to different groups. All coders were instructed to work independently and did not know the names of other coders in their groups. Thus, every account was classified independently by 5 coders.

It is important to note that coders did not work with live Twitter accounts. Instead, we used tweets and other data from our collection to re-create Twitter accounts as they looked like at the time our collection was running. Obviously, there is no chance to replicate accounts exactly (for example, we do not include non-political tweets because they did not contain any of our keywords or hashtags and therefore were ignored by our collection filters). However, in addition to featuring up to 100 tweets from the account,⁴² we made use of account metadata to reproduce the number of followers, friends, tweets, as well as account description, geo-location, user and background pictures, date of account creation, and other information typically available on a Twitter web-page.

In order to insure the reliability of coding, after our 5-coders groups finished coding all 512 accounts, we examined the inter-coder agreement in each group for each account and imposed a stringent requirement for an account to be considered reliably classified: it had to be put into a particular category (bot/cyborg/human/official account/spam) by at least 4 out of 5 coders. This is a rather stringent approach that guarantees the inter-coder reliability is at least as high as 80%. Stringency of this requirement notwithstanding, more than 80% of accounts pass this requirement.

Table 2 shows the results of the verification. Of the accounts classified reliably, 77% belong to bots, and further 1% are cyborgs who share more characteristics with bots than with humans. Reliably identified humans constitute only 1.4% of our dataset. These results reveal an outstanding precision of the five bot-detection methods we have used.

The share of bots is probably even higher than above calculations indicate. Only 25 of 95 unclear accounts have been claimed to belong to a human being by at least a single

⁴²If an account had more than 100 tweets in our collection, we used the most recent 100 tweets.

Table 2: Results of suspicious accounts verification

	No friends	Low ratio	Entropy	Repeat themselves	Repeat others	Totals
Bots	82	77	83	72	93	394
Cyborgs	1	0	3	1	0	5
Humans	1	0	2	4	1	7
Official accounts	2	0	0	0	0	2
Spam	0	7	1	1	0	9
Unclear	13	51	11	12	8	95
Totals	99	135	100	90	102	512

Note: Entries are frequencies. Row sums do not equal row totals because some methods produced overlapping sets of accounts (see Table 1).

coder. Typically, the discrepancies in the coding that generate unclear accounts are due to attributing accounts to spam or cyborgs by some coders and to bots by others. Hence, even those accounts that belong to the category of unclear are much more likely to be bots than humans. Still, from here forward, we restrict our analysis to 394 accounts that were reliably classified as bots.

As already mentioned, our coders coded accounts by subtypes, which includes seven subtypes of bots. Examining the distribution of bots across subtypes (last column of Table 3), reveals that more than 90% belong to just three subtypes: news headlines with and without links and (the very distant third) accounts that consist entirely of retweets from other accounts.⁴³

Several interesting patterns emerge from breaking down the types of bots by their source of detection (first five columns in Table 3). For example, 38% of accounts that do not follow any other accounts (first column) feature tweets with links to the news story; for accounts that do follow other accounts (second column) this share jumps to 74%. While the former most likely simply aim to promote specific news in search engine rankings, the latter seem to be designed in the hope that at least a few people would follow them back and then click on the news link. Accounts repeating others are similar to accounts with no friends: 73% of them

⁴³In retrospect, this should not be surprising how easy it is to setup simple accounts like this. Adding diverse streams of content, videos, pictures, etc., on the other hand, requires more sophisticated programming.

tweet news headlines with no link to the story. Accounts that repeat themselves are different; they more often feature diverse content (quotes from famous people, beauty and character advice, etc.). It is this content that tends to be repeated to attract followers, who are then exposed to fresh news stories, often with a link to the website. The low entropy method as well catches a different kind of bots: those that retweet content from other accounts.⁴⁴

Table 3: Verified bots by type and method of identification

	No friends	Low ratio	Entropy	Repeat themselves	Repeat others	Total
Retweets only	3	8	26	3	3	9
Videos only	2	0	0	0	0	< 1
Pictures only	2	0	0	0	1	1
Text only:						
– News headlines only:						
News headlines with links	38	74	40	41	15	40
News headlines without links	48	15	26	36	73	42
– Other text	3	2	2	5	1	3
Diverse content	3	2	7	15	7	6

Note: Entries are column percentages (may not sum up to 100 due to rounding).

5.5 Political orientations in a subsample of verified political bots

In addition to coding each account as bot, human, cyborg, spam or official account, we also coded their political orientation. Given a rather small sample size, this analysis remains preliminary, but interesting patterns we uncover suggest that our bot-detection methods are promising as a tool for quantitative studies of the types online government engagement strategies described in the previous sections of this manuscript.

We distinguish between three different political orientations: *pro-Kremlin*, *pro-opposition* and *pro-Ukrainian*. This choice was dictated both by the our research framework and by the activity patterns in Russian segment of Internet during the time our collection was running. As anecdotal evidence of Russian governments activity in social media continues to mount,

⁴⁴We suspect that there could be two explanations for this pattern. First, it is possible that tweeting in this case might not be triggered by the news headline appearing in the news agency feed, and therefore the bot designer would have to specify the frequency of posting as part of the code governing the bot’s behavior. Alternatively, accounts that retweet everything from many other accounts may simply get to tweet more often than a typical news agency comes up with a new story.

our principle interest was in studying accounts that post content friendly to the Russian government. However, the Russian government (as well as governments around the world) often claims that it is the victim, nor perpetrator, of bot attacks. Explicitly looking for both pro- and anti-government content in the same collection of tweets provides a valuable opportunity to verify both claims on the level playing field. However, since the timing of our data collection coincided with the political crisis in Ukraine and further Russian involvement there, we decided to distinguish between anti-government content that mostly was focused on Russian domestic politics, and content focused on the Ukrainian conflict. Thus, the accounts that our coders find to spread content unfriendly to the Russian government is split into two categories: pro-opposition and pro-Ukrainian.

In this exercise, our focus was on accounts whose political identification is strikingly clear and unambiguously manifest in most of their tweets to even a casual reader.⁴⁵ To this end, we deliberately defined the *neutral* category as broadly as possible, so that those accounts that end up classified as non-neutral have indeed a very strong political bias. Furthermore, in the coding schema provided to coders accounts that do not neatly fit either of our “camps” (for example, praise Kremlin for its foreign ventures, but loathe its for economic policy) were also left in the neutral category.⁴⁶ Table 4 shows the resulting classification, broken down by the method used to identify the bots.

Table 4 highlights interesting findings. First, more than a half of bots are neutral, meaning that they do not carry any explicit political message. This does not mean they are not setup with political purposes. As we mentioned above, many bots (particularly among those who have no friends and post the same text with many other bots) feature primarily news headlines

⁴⁵Thus, for example, we didn’t examine the political orientation of the news story a bot was spreading, although this would be an interesting subject for future research.

⁴⁶We again adopted stringent inter-coder reliability requirements to ensure a high-level of reliability for any positive classification of a political orientation. To this end we imposed the following rule: if even just 2 of 5 coders put the account into two different partisan categories (for instance, pro-Ukrainian and pro-opposition), we considered this account as coded unreliably (the “Unclear” category in Table 4). If there was no disagreement between coders regarding the partisanship of the account, and coders only differed if it belongs to a particular group or is neutral, we opted for neutral if three or more coders categorized it as such; only otherwise we have put it in the partisan category.

Table 4: Ideological distribution of verified bots

	No friends	Low ratio	Entropy	Repeat themselves	Repeat others	Totals
Pro-Kremlin	13	16	8	8	8	11
Pro-opposition	1	1	11	1	2	4
Pro-Ukrainian	4	3	12	3	3	5
Neutral	65	55	41	51	76	58
Unclear	17	26	28	36	11	23

Note: Entries are column percentages (may not sum up to 100 due to rounding).

to promote them in search rankings. These headlines usually come from large media agencies that produce enough routine factual news (who said what, went where and signed which memorandum) to appear neutral according to our deliberately broad notion of neutrality. This applies even to the state-owned media. It does not mean, however, that if their stories make it to the top, and readers will go to their website, they will find a politically neutral and objective media.

Second, taken together pro-opposition and pro-Ukrainian bots (9%) are almost as common as pro-Kremlin ones (11%). This result may seem unexpected given the mass media’s clamor about Kremlin’s social media propaganda campaigns. At the same time, this result might also imply that Kremlin prefers more sophisticated and expensive online propaganda techniques like paid trolls, whereas the Russian opposition and pro-Ukrainian users may so far lack resources to employ those techniques at a large scale.⁴⁷

Does the behavior of bots with different ideological orientation vary? We explore this issue in two ways by focusing both on content and the dynamics of tweeting activity. In terms of the former, Figure 3 presents bar plots illustrating the popularity of the 15 most common hashtags within every orientation group, including neutral bots. One can see from the graph that all types of bots discussed political developments in Ukraine and include a variety of hashtags about the Euromaidan protests, as well as further tragic events in Odessa

⁴⁷We also cannot rule out the possibility that at least some of the anti-Kremlin bots, particularly pro-Ukrainian bots with the most vicious content, were created as a provocation against the Ukrainian cause. The methods presented here are not suited to test this hypothesis, but an analysis of network structure in the future could shed light on this matter.

and Eastern Ukraine. Despite these similarities, though, there are also important differences across orientation groups. For instance, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which plays a peace-keeping role in Eastern Ukraine, is more popular among pro-Ukrainian bots, whereas the U.S. and NATO appear among common hashtags for pro-Kremlin bots. Hashtags in support of a Ukrainian officer Nadezhda Savcheko, who was captured and put on trial in Russia (allegedly in relation to the death of Russian journalists who covered the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine), is among the most popular hashtags among pro-opposition, but not pro-Ukrainian, bots.




Figure 3: Most Common Hashtags

Table 5 reports Jaccard similarity scores, a popular measure of the similarity between two sets that shows how many elements the two sets have in common in comparison to the total

number of elements in the sets.⁴⁸ Thus we find that pro-opposition and pro-Ukrainian bots are closest in terms of their used hashtags, whereas neutral bots are furthest apart from the rest, as Table demonstrates.

Table 5: Jaccard similarities of 50 most popular hashtags

	pro-Kremlin	pro-opposition	pro-Ukrainian	Neutral
pro-Kremlin	1.00	0.27	0.30	0.25
pro-opposition		1.00	0.39	0.19
pro-Ukrainian			1.00	0.23
Neutral				1.00

Note: Entries are Jaccard similarities between sets of 50 most popular hashtags in every group of bots. Jaccard similarities range from 0 to 1, where 0 refers to a pair of sets that have no common element, whereas 1 refers to a pair of sets that are identical.

Another way to examine the similarity of bots with different political orientation is to look at when and how much they tweet. Figure 4 reveals that the pro-opposition bots we identified were more active than the pro-Kremlin bots we examined at the very beginning of 2014, and pro-Ukrainian bot activity was virtually non-existent. With the annexation of Crimea, the conflict escalation, and Russian involvement becoming more assertive, pro-Kremlin bot activity quickly caught up with the pro-opposition bot activity by the late Spring of 2014. By summer, the pro-Ukrainian bots we identified were in full swing too.

All three sets of bots produced roughly the same levels of activity through the end of 2014, but then began to diverge again. Pro-opposition activity was gradually dwindling, but this trend was interrupted when late at night on February 27th, 2015 one of the most prominent leaders of the Russian opposition, Boris Nemtsov, was shot dead in front of the Kremlin. His tragic death generated one of the largest waves of identical tweets in our collection that involved more than 1,800 of the users for whom we have data. Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin

⁴⁸Technically, the Jaccard similarity coefficient ($J(A,B)$) between sets A and B is $J(A,B) = \frac{|A \cap B|}{|A \cup B|}$, where $|A \cap B|$ is the number of elements that A and B have in common, and $|A \cup B|$ is the total number of elements in the two sets. Table 5 presents Jaccard similarities for sets of 50 most common hashtags in different groups of bots by political orientation.




Figure 4: Political Bots' Tweeting Activity over Time

bots' activity remained relatively constant and did not match the marked increase in activity by pro-Ukrainian bots in the beginning of 2015, when the war in Eastern Ukraine escalated again.⁴⁹

6 Online opposition, regimes, and bots: discussion

When social media first burst onto the political scene – and into the writing of political scientists – the overwhelming emphasis was on its potential for allowing citizens to become organized outside of traditional hierarchical arrangements. Nowhere was this more important

⁴⁹This disparity in cyber-war effort could be said to mirror the changes on the ground, as Kremlin was no longer interested in the conflict and, instead of taking advantage of escalation to stage an offensive, put just enough resources to coerce Ukrainians into the Minsk agreement, which essentially preserved the status-quo and frozen the conflict based on the Transnistria model. (See Cristian Ghinea, "Transnistria and Eastern Ukraine – Any Similarities?," *Emerging Europe*, February 11, 2015, <http://emerging-europe.com/voices/voices-economy/ghinea-transnistria-and-eastern-ukraine-any-similarities/>.)

than in authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes, where social media was posited as a way to level the playing field when traditional institutions were largely under the control of the state (Diamond and Plattner 2012; Howard and Hussain 2013; Tucker et al. 2014, 2016).

If we want to label this original interpretation of the intersection of Social Media and Politics as “Social Media 1.0”, then “Social Media 2.0” could be the story of how these same authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes woke up to the possibilities of social media as a threat to their regimes and how they responded.⁵⁰ With that in mind, the goal of this manuscript has been three-fold. First, we have provided a classification system for the menu of options at the disposal of regimes seeking to address online opposition including offline responses, online restriction of access to content, and attempts to engage with a user’s online experience. Second, we have demonstrated that this classification system allows us to provide a rich qualitative description of the evolution of Russia’s internet policy since the first election of Putin as Russian president in 2000, which hopefully will be its own important contribution to the literature above and beyond demonstrating the value of the theoretical framework. Finally, we have sought to demonstrate that identifying one particular form of online engagement – the use of political bots – is a fruitful area for future academic research by providing a proof of concept that it is indeed possible to use digital forensic techniques to observe and analyze this form of online engagement.

Our preliminary empirical analysis shows high precision of our digital forensic techniques that allow us to identify bots with a high level of confidence. However, the fact that a relatively small proportion of the bots we detect are pro-Kremlin, whereas the majority are politically neutral accounts that post news headlines, might imply that government online engagement is multifaceted and includes both direct engagement through government-controlled bots and indirect one through supporting pro-regime mass media that promote themselves online by using bots. Thus even this preliminary first “proof of concept” step suggests an important

⁵⁰While this is clearly a subject far beyond the current manuscript, “Social Media 3.0” may very well turn out to be the story of how anti-systemic forces in existing democracies harnessed social media to fuel the rise of populist political movements.

warning for scholars seeking to study the behavior of pro-government bots: simply applying bot detection techniques to collections of political tweets and assuming that whatever is identified by the method is government activity has the potential of grossly overestimating the prevalence of such behavior.

Our empirical analysis also demonstrated that different types of bots perform different types of functions, and, intriguingly, that different techniques can be used to locate these different types of bots. Thus although bots are but one tool at the disposal of political agents to try to impact the online experience of citizens, it appears that even this specific category – algorithmically controlled social media accounts – is but an overarching category for a diverse set of tools.

The potential future research that our preliminary work in this manuscript has identified as both possible and important strikes us as vast indeed. At the most focused level, the next steps within Russia should involve harnessing tools of machine learning to be able to code entire collections of political tweets in terms of the likelihood that content was produced by bots. Once this task is complete, it will then be possible to test specific hypotheses regarding the way in which the Russian state – and its political opponents – have utilized bots in an effort to shape the online experience of Russians.

More generally, though, both the classification systems and digital forensic tools developed in this manuscript could be applied far beyond Russia. Next steps could include theory development for cross-national predictions about the relative prevalence of offline activity, online suppression of contention, and online engagement with users based on political and economic goals and resources, cross-national case studies to compare with the Russian case in this manuscript, and eventually cross-sectional time-series statistical analysis. In addition, the types of bot analysis demonstrated in the previous section and discussed in this one could of course also be applied around the world anywhere researchers have access to social media data. Truly, we are in the very early days of figuring out what we can and should be studying

in terms of how regimes combat online opposition – but then, again, so too are the regimes themselves.

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Appendix A Keywords and hashtags for collecting Twitter Data

- медведев
- духовныескрепры
- путинвор
- путинах
- пжив
- Стратегия31
- триумфальная
- болотная
- оппозиция
- горожанепротив
- сурковскаяпропаганда
- навальный
- занавального
- команданавального
- судвкирове
- PussyRiot
- толоконникова
- народныйсход
- сднемпобеды
- #sochi2014
- #sochi
- #putinsgames
- #сочи - Sochi
- #витишко -
- #считаемвместе
- #sochifail
- #sochi2014problems
- голодовка
- МинутаНеМолчания
- жалкий
- путин
- спасибопутинузаэто
- прямаялиния
- партияжуликовиворов
- едро
- бмая

- собяниннашмэр
- маршмиллионов
- зачестныевыборы
- болотноедело
- бшау
- свободуполитзаключенным
- свободуузникамбмая
- росузник
- одинзавсех
- всезаодного
- рассерженные
- честныевыборы
- удальцов
- высурковскаяпропаганда
- 37годвернулся
- ДМП
- привет37год
- кровавыйрежим
- кировлес
- ПуссиРайот
- толокно
- бирюлево
- хватиткормитькавказ
- хватитвинитькавказ
- русскиймарш
- Сочи2014
- #олимпиада
- #олимпийскаязачистка
- #sochiproblems
- Одесса
- #Nemtsov
- #Немцов
- немцов
- савченко
- #FreeSavchenko
- #Putinkiller
- майдаун
- майданер
- майданутый
- #ПутинУмер
- #МинутаНеМолчания
- Su24
- Су-24

- Cy24
- #самолет
- #RussianJet
- #ExpelTurkeyFromNATO
- #Russianplane
- #Erdogan
- #Latakia

Appendix B Russian government online: a long way from Putin to Putin

B.1 2000-2008: Internet vs. traditional media in Putin's Russia

Russian reforms of 1990s got mixed assessment from both outside observers (Shleifer and Treisman 2001) and reformers themselves (Gaidar 2003), and their reception among Russians remains ambiguous at best (Denisova, Eller, and Zhuravskaya 2010). However, a wide consensus holds that if anything worked during the painful transition from Communism, it was media freedom (Zasursky 2004). Diverse, influential and competitive news outlets emerged almost immediately and by the end of 1990s several powerful media conglomerates were operating alongside a large network of independent federal and regional media, usually free of any government control (Lipman 2009). This is proved by the enormous role media played in political fights throughout 1990s (Koltsova 2006) and, above all, during so-called war for Yeltsin's succession (Gel'man, Travin, and Marganiya 2014, 104-108), when high-powered media was mobilized by both Putin and his opponents. Role of the media in Putin's rise to power is well documented by rigorous quantitative studies (Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya 2011), Putin's biographers (Gessen 2012, Chapter 2), Western observers (Judah 2013, Chapter 2) and Russian political memorialists alike (Tregubova 2003, Chapter 10). This experience allowed Putin to fully appreciate the power of the media to change public opinion and reverse political fortunes. Putin's media policy in the next 15 years demonstrates that he took this lesson extremely seriously and worked tirelessly to put media under his control (Lipman 2009; Burrett 2010). However, as we shall see, this policy was not universally applied to all types of media. To the contrary, online media enjoyed the *laissez-faire* regime that was in many respects on par with most advanced democracies. To uncover the reason, why Putin had drawn such sharp line between traditional and online media, we will start by examining the Soviet experience of media control. Seemingly inconsistent strategy Putin adopted would become much less surprising if discussed in light of the strategy once devised by Putin's (former KGB lieutenant colonel) employers at the Central Committee and Lubyanka. Next, we will

discuss main features of Putin’s dual strategy and assess the changes in political and media environment, which ultimately rendered it unworkable.

Soviet Union, as a relatively long-lived 20th century dictatorship⁵¹, survived several waves of technological advancement. Already in 1917 Bolsheviks famously recognized the role of modern technologies and communications by seizing (along with the Winter Palace, railway stations, bridges and army headquarters) Petrograd’s Telegraph and Telephone Exchanges. This recognition entailed two different strategies – for mass and personal communications – which were implemented fairly persistently throughout Soviet history. The government maintained the complete monopoly over the mass communication and fiercely prosecuted those who tried to challenge this monopoly. Most famous examples include jamming of Western radio broadcasters (Radio Liberty, Voice of America, BBC, etc.) and strict regulations over using printers, plotters and photocopier after they were installed at various Soviet administrative departments and institutions⁵² (Komaromi 2004).

Personal communications was a different matter. Instead of monopolizing their usage, government allowed Soviet citizens to use them promiscuously and then used it to identify and prosecute those who were disloyal. Phones, for example, were spreading rapidly in the USSR, approaching roughly 37 million, or about 13 per 100 inhabitants in 1990 (Banks and Wilson 2013). It was still six times as small as the U. S. at the time, but the difference was due to technological and economic reasons, not political restrictions. However, government used every opportunity to spy over its citizens using wiretapping. Under Stalin serious efforts were put in the research on speaker identification, which was famously depicted by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the autobiographical novel *In the First Circle*. Later the elaborate system of surveillance and spread of personal, but publicly registered home phones eliminated the need in voice identification. Similarly, typewriters were allowed for personal use, however their printout had to be handed to the *First Department* (local KGB affiliates at any Soviet

⁵¹According to Przeworski et al. (2000) average dictatorship which was overthrown between 1950 and 1990 lasted 27.4 years and average dictatorship still in course in 1990 was 26.2 years old.

⁵²The last among these regulations, which was not enforced anymore, was struck down by the Russian Supreme Court only in 2009.

enterprize or institution) and could be cross-verified to identify the exact typewriter used in printing “inappropriate” materials.

After assuming power in 1999, Pitin gradually implemented similar strategy of complete monopolization of mass media and liberal policy on personal communications. While the latter was virtually left free from interference (but not from surveillance⁵³), national television networks were returned to government ownership and Soviet-style management with weekly instructions delivered at Kremlin to the news executives (Gehlbach 2010). Press and radio remained more diverse, with some pro-government and some relatively independent outlets competing with each other (Lipman 2009; Womack 2014). The process of putting traditional media under government control in the early 2000s included such colorful episodes as imprisonment of media mogul and oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky (in order to be released he signed a secret protocol with Russian Minister of Communications Mikhail Lesin and handed over his media assets to state natural gas monopoly Gazprom) and stunning reversal of fortunes for the architect of both Yeltsin’s electoral victory in 1996 and Putin’s one in 2000 Boris Berezovsky (who lost control of main Russian TV channel and went to exile already by 2001) (Becker 2004). This and other episodes and their consequences for the media landscape are well documented in literature (see academic studies in Burrett 2010; Dunn 2008; Burrett 2008; for more informal discussion see Gessen 2012, Chapter 7; and an illuminating personal memoir by Tregubova 2003, Chapters 11-13). Putin’s approach to the internet, on other hand, was rarely assessed. Observers simply noted that “the Russian blogosphere is a space that appears to be largely free of government control” (Etling et al. 2010, 33); “the absence of Internet filtering is notable. Based on tests run through the OpenNet Initiative, we continue to find no evidence of significant technical filtering of the Russian Internet” (Alexanyan et al. 2012, 10-11), etc. A recent account by one of the leading Russian internet news producers Anton Nossik suggests that it was no accident. Instead, already in 1999, still prime-minister Vladimir Putin had a clear preference for non-interference in the internet space:

⁵³Sophisticated “deep pocket” web surveillance system known as SORM (-2,-3) was installed by the Russian government no later than in the late 1990s and has been being updated constantly ever since (see Soldatov and Borogan 2013).

... in December 1999, three days before he became acting president of Russia, Vladimir Putin [...] summoned all the heads of Russia’s nascent Internet industry for a meeting [...]. In his brief but passionate speech that day, Putin made special mention of Chinese and Vietnamese models of Internet regulation, stating that he viewed them as unacceptable. “Whenever we’ll have to choose between excessive regulation and protection of online freedom, we’ll definitely opt for freedom,” he concluded [...]. (Nossik 2014)

Under the auspices of such a benevolent government policy, Russian online media flourished, creating a vibrant sector of the economy and a reliable source of information for millions of Russians. Russia is one of the few countries where Google is not the most popular search engine and Facebook is not the most popular social network. Remarkably, both occurred without restrictions on American competitors. Unlike Baidu and Weibo, Yandex, Odnoklassniki and Vkontakte won virtually fair competition with their American counterparts⁵⁴. Successful development of local services did not mean that foreign ones were not actively used by Russian bloggers and readers. LiveJournal, the most popular Russian social network in 2001-2011, while being originally American and predominantly English-speaking, developed Russian community so large that it was eventually overtaken by a Russian media holding and became dominated by Russian users (Greenall 2012). And as of April, 2014 Facebook has 24 million users from Russia⁵⁵ and Twitter has more than 8 million⁵⁶, which makes Russian one of 10 most popular languages on Twitter⁵⁷.

Again, in stark contrast with most other countries, Russian most popular news web-sites do not represent traditional media such as newspapers, radio and TV broadcasters (Nossik 2014). Instead, *Gazeta.Ru*, *Lenta.Ru*, *NewsRu.com*, *Polit.ru* and alike were built from scratch and became major news outlets in their own right (i.e. their staff does original reporting,

⁵⁴Still, Vkontakte (but not Yandex or Odnoklassniki) had significantly benefited from the lax enforcement of the property rights. However, this doesn’t make comparison with China less impressive, given that China is also famous for wide-spread piracy.

⁵⁵<http://ria.ru/technology/20121004/766127348.html>

⁵⁶<http://digit.ru/internet/20131031/407481403.html>

⁵⁷<http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/the-languages-of-twitter-users/>

often as an eyewitness, rather than just digitalize other's content).

As a result, Russia developed a strong, powerful and independent internet media sphere, which was a remarkable achievement for any non-democratic country, but especially for one, where traditional media are so tightly controlled. As Alexanyan et al. (2012) note "Russia is unusual in the degree of freedom found online compared to offline media and political restrictions". Such imbalance, however, proved to be unsustainable. In the late 2000s internet media increasingly supplemented and eventually supplanted TV as the main news source at least for the educated Russians (Clover 2011). One of the leading Russian TV anchors Leonid Parfenov, who has been banned from air since 2004, aptly summarized this process in 2010 speech, which went viral on YouTube (Remnick 2011):

These evergreen tricks are known to everyone who has witnessed the Central Television of the USSR. Reports are replaced by protocol shootings like "Meeting at the Kremlin"; reporter's intonations support the officials in the picture; broadcasting models are implemented to show "the leader receiving a minister or a governor", "the leader campaigns among the masses ", "the leader holding a summit with his foreign colleague", etc. These are not news; this is old record that repeats the already established patterns of broadcasting. Even a news hook isn't a must. In the emasculated media environment any small fry will pass for a big shot just because of getting some airtime.

[...]

It hurts twice as much to speak about television journalism, given the evident success of the large-scale TV shows and Russian school of television series. Russian TV is getting more and more sophisticated in exciting, fascinating, entertaining and amusing people, but it hardly could be called civic social and political institution. I am convinced it is the reason for the dramatic decline in TV viewership among the most active part of the population. People of our type say: "Why bother turning on the box? It's not intended for us".

However, as Nossik (2014) notes, this dual strategy – tight control of the traditional media and almost complete nonintervention in the web – was devised when Russian internet penetration was almost negligible. Even three years after Putin came to power, in 2002, Russia has 2.1 million people (2% of the adult population) who used internet daily ⁵⁸. By 2008 this share increased to 14 million (16% of the adult population), and by 2013 to 52.2 million people (46% of the adult population)⁵⁹. Needless to say, the quality of access changed dramatically after wide access to broadband connection replaced slow dialup. This circumstances diminished the value of monopoly in TV broadcasting and strong influence in other traditional media which Kremlin enjoyed (Oates and Lokot 2013) and simultaneously made the online communities sufficiently large and well-structured to become politically significant. Dual nature social media, which is simultaneously mass and personal communication, presented a particular challenge for the government.

These changes coincided with the constitutionally required transition of power from Putin (who served two consecutive terms) to Medvedev in 2008. While Putin was appointed Prime Minister of Russia immediately after elections and Medvedev was widely considered as a weak leader, who never freed himself from Putin’s oversight, Medvedev had his own agenda and probably nowhere else it was more visible than in his approach towards information technologies and internet in particular.

B.2 2008-2012: “Blogger-in-Chief” and his followers

Dmitry Medvedev’s approach towards internet was integral part of his general agenda. Laid out in an article “Russia, Forward!”, which was published in liberal (and online-only) newspaper *Gazeta.ru*, his *modernization* plan aimed to preserve the basic parameters of the political system built by Putin, but make it more efficient and friendlier towards businesses and citizens (Sakwa 2014, Chapters 3-5). This included, for example, establishing Moscow as an international financial center, police reform, boosting higher education international compet-

⁵⁸<http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/internet/internet1133/vesna2011>

⁵⁹<http://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/11417>

itiveness and creation of a functioning e-government (see and overview of Medvedev's reforms in Black 2014; Black and Johns 2013). Medvedev signature project was Skolkovo, a publicly funded, but semi-independently managed high-tech incubator near Moscow. Obviously, the success of these projects was dependent on creative class in major population centers, and IT professionals in particular. Thus establishing a communications channels with these people, who were largely ignored by the blatant Soviet-style TV propaganda, was the first order of business for Medvedev. And unlike in many other areas, he did not hesitate to break with Putin legacy, and put the traditionally solemn and unquestioned presidential speech in the caustic domain of the social networks.

Less than a year after assuming office, in early 2009 Medvedev started a video blog which quickly moved to LiveJournal – then Russian main social network and blogging platform. In 2010 he visited Silicon Valley, met Steve Jobs and opened a twitter account at Twitter headquarters in San Francisco. Notably, his account began to follow (in addition to foreign heads of states and Russian officials) several bloggers known for their criticism of the government and newsfeed from radio station *Echo of Moscow* – perhaps the most critical of government among major media outlets in Russia. Finally, in 2011 he opened his Facebook page, which he occasionally used to communicate with its readers on the matters not covered or ill-covered by the official media (such as 2011 protests) using a different, more frank tone. In all social networks he build a large readership, which is typical for heads of states, but still notable since the environment was completely different from the general media environment Medvedev was used to: here he could not get his message through simply by eliminating competition and controlling the platform and the agenda (Yagodin 2012). In addition, in a rare occasion in 2011 he visited small private TV channel *Rain*, which at the time was mainly accessible online. As a result, Medvedev got permanently associated with blogging and social networks, and even called both in Russia and abroad “Blogger-in-Chief” (see for example West 2010), which simultaneously gave him credit for being up-to-date with the internet age and suggested that his rhetoric translates in little action.

Medvedev was not embarking on social media platforms alone. While it still remained an exception for high-level public officials at the time, several of his aids established significant presence on the social media. In particular, his close aid and economics adviser Arkady Dvorkovich maintains one of the most popular Russian twitter accounts with close to half a million followers; he also has a Facebook page, as does Medvedev's press-secretary Natalya Timakova (who as a former journalist is Facebook friend of many prominent liberal reporters). However, probably even more important was the establishment of large-scale and permanent operation to push pro-government agenda on the web and in social media in particular. Following the long-standing Russian tradition, government action came late, but quickly. Pro-Kremlin youth movements, created to combat color revolution on Moscow streets and squares (Hale 2006) were partially repurposed to push pro-government agenda online. Its leaders (in case of *Nashi* they were called *commissars*) became active bloggers, but they never relied on the persuasion capacity of their messages. Instead they gradually created a network of online support. Until then Russian government presence on social media was very limited. A report by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, which was published in late 2010 and covered Russian blogosphere – concentrated in LiveJournal at the time – in May 2009 – September 2010, found that “pro-government bloggers are not especially prominent and do not constitute their own cluster” (Etling et al. 2010, 3). Moreover, those affiliated with the government “are not central nodes in any of the political or social clusters [...] investigated” (33).

A network of support started with artificial intelligence rather than human effort. Networks of bots got frequently employed first to flood opposition blogs with meaningless or assaultive content. Later they began to push alternative, pro-government messages to top charts and help pro-government bloggers to attract new followers. A report by the Berkman Center noted that “there is a concentration of bloggers affiliated with pro-government youth groups among the Instrumental bloggers [i.e. bots]” (3). However, real bloggers soon followed. In less than a year – which also witnessed the transition of the discussion core of the Russian blogosphere from LiveJournal to Twitter – pro-government bloggers emerged as a distinct, and indeed,

one of the largest clusters on Russian political Twitter (Kelly et al. 2012, 11). This result holds even after filtering out bots and other instrumental accounts, which remained numerous in the pro-government segment.

Continuous monitoring of the Russian blogosphere, undertaken by “Internet in Russian society” program at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University in 2010 – 2014 reveals several distinctive characteristics of pro-government segment in Russian social networks, as compared both to oppositional and “uncommitted” users. First, due to the general weakness and high fragmentation of the Russian opposition, “many active Russian bloggers [...] engage on political topics without ‘choosing a team’. [...] most Russian bloggers prefer to declare an independent intellectual posture, and eschew group affiliations” (Etling et al. 2010, 19). In contrast, pro-government bloggers tend to declare their political preferences and affiliation. Moreover, usage of predominantly pro-government hashtags in Twitter was highly concentrated among pro-government users, at least compared to predominately oppositional hashtags, which were more widely used in different clusters. Finally, while pro-government users demonstrate high commitment in terms of the number of hashtag mentions (after the first one), they usually did it in a short time period, producing sharply peaked distribution of hashtag popularity (Barash and Kelly 2012).

As blogosphere remain the most ideologically diverse media environment in Russia, pro-government users experience pressures absent in other media. A comparative study of Russian blogosphere and TV in the year before the Duma elections of 2011 reveals that such competitive environment forces pro-government bloggers to engage with their adversaries in cases when TV and even newspapers could largely ignore oppositional activity. Etling, Roberts, and Faris (2014) give an example of the oppositional youth retreat in the outskirts of Moscow, which was intended to countervail large government-sponsored youth camp “Seliger”. Largely overlooked by the traditional media, it became the subject of the heated discussion between leading oppositional and pro-government bloggers on Twitter.

Online response to hostile (or perceived as such) internet activity through direct engagement with users remained the “weapon of choice” during Medvedev presidency, but certainly it wasn’t the only one. Both offline response and attempts to go through the online infrastructure did take place, but the latter were relatively rare and quite limited in their scope and the former was not a part of any systematic internet policy, and as such could not (and wasn’t intended to) change the digital media landscape.

Up until the end of Medvedev’s presidential term the only type of internet infrastructure infringement known in Russia were relatively brief (lasting up to several days) DDoS attacks on particular web resources (Agora 2011; Freedom House 2011). The first major attack was launched on August 6, 2009 – the first anniversary of the Russo-Georgia 5-days war. The target was pro-Georgian blogger *cyxymu*. The attack was strong enough to significantly disrupt Facebook and completely shut down Twitter and LiveJournal (Mills 2009). The series of smaller attacks on various LiveJournal blogs and independent media culminated on the weekend of the Russian Duma elections of 2011, when two dozens of the most prominent independent media (including *The New Times*, *Kommersant*, *Echo of Moscow*, *Novaya Gazeta*, *Slon*, etc.), blogs (including the entire LiveJournal platform) and, most crucially, election monitors’ coordinating portals (including the largest one, GOLOS) were shut down for hours (Roberts and Etling 2011). Later many of the very same resources were attacked during oppositional rallies after elections and in the early 2012.

Importantly, DDoS attacks, unlike filtering (and offline response), could be used not only by the government, but also by the opposition. In early 2012 Russian branch of international cyber activist group *Anonymous* blocked web sites of the Russian government, Kremlin and several major state media, such as *Vesti* and *RIA Novosti*⁶⁰. These attacks, however, did last only several hours (compared to several days in the case of LiveJournal), and, obviously, could not impede state response to demonstrations.

⁶⁰<http://habrahabr.ru/post/143501/>; <http://lenta.ru/news/2012/05/10/attack/>

Finally, offline response by Russian government to unfriendly internet activity was not yet separated from the general anti-opposition activity and was not legally or organizationally institutionalized. Market regulation and government entrepreneurship was still targeted at traditional media: for example, in 2011 newspaper *Moskovskiy Novosti* was relaunched by state news agency *RIA Novosti*. As it was widely assumed, the project was aimed to provide moderate competition to privately owned (and quite critical) *Vedomosti*, simultaneously being more friendly to Medvedev than most state media, loyal to Putin⁶¹. Later that year Medvedev announced the establishment of the Public Television of Russia, which faced no private competition, but shared the second goal with *Moskovskiy Novosti*⁶².

Violence and legal action against bloggers were relatively rare and mostly took place in the North Caucasus. Legal restrictions, if any, were imposed under the auspices of the general anti-terrorist laws and orders, mostly having to do with combating Chechen and Dagestani insurgencies. While anti-terrorist rationale was often abused for the sake of winning over political enemies in the respective republics, these cases were rarely consequential at the federal level (Simons 2013). In few cases outside the Caucasus prosecutions were largely a regional matter or the result of local security apparatus initiatives rather than implementation of any national strategy. Prominent cases from that time included blogger Savva Terentyev from Komi Republic, who in 2008 was convicted of defamation of the “social group ‘law enforcement personnel’” and sentenced to one year of imprisonment with a probation period of one year after an anti-police comment at Liverjournal. Another prominent case took place in 2009 in the Republic of Tatarstan, where a former government official turned opposition blogger posted false rumor that the governor of the republic has died. He was convicted of libel and defamation of the “social group ‘government officials’” and sentenced for 2 years in

⁶¹A. Morozov. 2011. “‘Moskovskie Novosti’ Space”. <http://os.colta.ru/media/projects/18065/details/21397/>; O. Barykova, and M. Zotova. 2011. “Ushlo li vremya ‘Moskovskikh Novostey’?”. BBC Russian. http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/04/110331_moscow_news_scandal.shtml; Meyer, Henry. 2011. “Putin Revives Gorbachev Glasnost Paper to Widen Election Appeal.” Bloomberg. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-30/putin-revives-gorbachev-glasnost-paper-to-widen-election-appeal.html>

⁶²As mentioned, execution of government projects in media suffers from general government inefficiency and the TV channel went on air only in 2013, long after Medvedev switched offices with Putin.

prison (Yudina [2012](#)).

Institutionalization of offline response, as well as means of control over the online infrastructure happened only after Dmitry Medvedev handed his office back to Vladimir Putin in 2012. However, the process was so quick that already by 2014 the relative importance of different types of government response was reversed: sheer force of offline response and establishment of a comprehensive system of internet filtering rendered the online engagement with users, created by Medvedev, almost irrelevant.

B.3 2012 – : Cracking down and giving up

Compared to transition from Putin to Medvedev in 2008, the reverse transition in 2012 was much less smooth. Announced on September 24, 2011 and immediately nicknamed as “castling”, it was met with resentment by both Medvedev supporters and those in opposition to both Medvedev and Putin (Judah [2013](#)). This resentment has transformed in large-scale street protests after parliamentary elections in December, 2011, which were widely considered as rigged⁶³. As we mentioned above, close relationship between Putin and Medvedev (culminated in “castling”), did not mean that Medvedev lacked his own agenda. In this case too his response was a program of moderate, but significant political reforms, announced in the Address to the Federal Assembly (Russian equivalent of the State of the Union) in late December of 2011, three weeks after Duma elections, and just after major protests had started. This program included, most importantly, reinstatement of popular elections of Russian governors and elections of MPs in districts (switching back from pure proportional to mixed electoral system) (Sakwa [2014](#), 129-132). These reforms, however, were either striped of any substance (like change in party registration rules) or explicitly reversed (like decriminalization of libel) (Chapters 7-8). Protest activity, on the other hand, was severely restricted after on May 6, 2012 (one day before Putin’s inauguration) an opposition rally was dispersed by force (hundreds of people were arrested and several dozens of them were subsequently prosecuted for

⁶³Post-election analysis revealed that suspicion was well-grounded (Kobak, Shpilkin, and Pshenichnikov [2012](#); Enikolopov et al. [2013](#)).

inciting riots and assaulting police).

It is in this context, when the freedom of Russian internet from filtering came to an end (Freedom House 2012, 2013). Already in July of 2012, despite vocal protests, including Russian Wikipedia temporary voluntary shut down, Russian State Duma adopted (and Vladimir Putin signed into law) so-called Internet Restriction Bill (Federal law of Russian Federation no. 139-FZ), which created a continuously updated Russian Internet Blacklist⁶⁴. The list, maintained by the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor), contains domain names which any Russian ISP has to permanently block on the grounds of containing pornography, copyright infringement or “extremist content”. Initially, items were to be included in the list per a court order and only if the hosting website fails to remove the content in 24 hours after receiving the notification. However, in December of 2013 new amendments to the Law on Information, Information Technology, and Information Protection provided the Office of the Prosecutor General with the authority to block websites without any court order. Moreover, the procedure was changed, so the web page were to be blocked first, and allowed to be accessible again only after it removes the content deemed as “calling for mass disorders, extremist activity, and participation in mass public events, which fail to follow appropriate regulations”⁶⁵ (Human Rights Watch 2014).

However, when at the height of Russian-Ukrainian conflict in March of 2014 several oppositional news web sites were blocked, even these loose rules were not followed. On March 13, 2014 *Grani.ru*, *Kasparov.ru* and *EJ.ru*, as well as popular opposition politician (in 2013 he ran for Moscow mayor and came second) Alexey Navalny’s LiveJournal blog, were blocked by all ISPs per government order. Since then several suits were brought to courts demanding the reason for the blocking. Journalists and Alexey Navalny asked authorities to identify specific materials on these websites that triggered the blocking, so that the materials could be removed and access reestablished. Throughout 2014 authorities repeatedly denied that

⁶⁴<http://eais.rkn.gov.ru/>

⁶⁵Text of the law: <http://www.rg.ru/2013/12/30/extrem-site-dok.html>.

they are under any obligation to provide such information and courts repeatedly dismissed the cases. Early in 2015, all three websites and Navalny's LiveJournal page remain completely blocked in Russia.

Still, Russian government incomplete control over the online infrastructure significantly impedes its ability to crack down on opposition activity simply by blocking web pages. The greatest threat, of course, are largest social media platforms – Facebook and Twitter. First, unlike most other web resources, Facebook's and Twitter's individual pages (say, a particular post or user profile) could not be blocked by the filtering software currently available to the Russian authorities (Sivkova 2014). Blocking the entire platforms, on the other hand, is still considered undesirable: it would further hurt Putin's regime reputation abroad and simultaneously hurt and potentially antagonize a large number of politically indifferent (and regime-friendly) users in Russia. In a rare event, a public official, Roskomnadzor deputy head Maxim Ksenzov, who speculated over such possibility, was publicly disproved by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in a Facebook post⁶⁶ and later was formally reprimanded. Of course, instead of blocking them, Russian government could ask them to police themselves and remove access to certain pages at least for users inside Russia. However, unlike Vkontakte, foreign social networks could easily ignore such orders. For example, in December of 2014 authorities requested Facebook and Vkontakte to block access to pages, allowing supporters of Alexey Navalny to register for a rally protesting his looming criminal conviction and receive updates about the place and time of the event. Vkontakte blocked the page and all subsequent attempts to create a copy, posting a warning that "This page is blocked upon receiving a Roskomnadzor notification of restricting access to information, which contains calls to participate in mass public events, which fail to follow appropriate regulations, as per the request of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Russia."⁶⁷ Facebook also blocked access to a similar page inside Russia⁶⁸, but after a huge outcry in Western media, refused to block

⁶⁶<https://www.facebook.com/Dmitry.Medvedev/posts/10152047885946851>

⁶⁷<https://vk.com/blank.php?rkn=32274605>; It should be noted that according to those "appropriate regulations" authorities could not be notified about the upcoming rally earlier than 15 days in advance. The page was blocked 26 days before the event it announced was scheduled to take place.

⁶⁸<https://www.facebook.com/events/417200101767938>

any other pages. Moreover, some Russian media outlets, which were afraid to report the scheduling of the event itself, covered the Roskomnadzor order and social networks response. As a result, more people learned about the event and the new event page opened on Facebook attracted even more people⁶⁹.

Given that second page attracted more than 33 thousands people, who stated that they are “going to the rally” (plus almost 6 thousands, who stated that they are “likely going”), it’s not surprising that the authorities resorted to offline response: they simply changed the data of the return proceedings to two weeks earlier. The new date was the day before the largest Russian holiday (The New Year’s Eve) and Navalny was informed less than 24 hours in advance. While the third event also attracted considerable number of supporters, combination of suddenness, cold weather and pre-holidays preparation likely reduced the turnout.

Offline response was certainly not limited to ad hoc solutions just described. Instead, government complete control over law enforcement apparatus and law making was actively used to augment its limited ability to censor social media platforms. Criminalization of online activity was first implemented through targeted amendments to existing criminal law, but was soon institutionalized in a dedicated law. Using media to spread information deemed extremist was always an aggravating circumstance in Russian criminal law. Laws missing such provision were sooner or later corrected: for instance, when in 2011 punishment for Article 280 of the Criminal Code was severed, using mass media for “extremism propaganda” became an aggravating circumstance. However, when just two years later, in 2013, a new extremism crime appeared in the Criminal Code (Article 280.1, Public Appeals to the Violation of the Territorial Integrity of the Russian Federation), using “mass media, including telecommunication networks (including ‘Internet’)” was added as the aggravating circumstance (Agora 2012, 2013).

In May, 2014 Vladimir Putin signed into law a requirement for any blogger with the daily readership in excess of 3000 people to register with the government and reveal her true identity

⁶⁹<https://www.facebook.com/events/406603402849183>

and email address ⁷⁰. In addition, bloggers will be held accountable for failure to verify the information they “spread”, have to keep archives of their postings and follow laws which regulate news production during electoral campaigns. However, institutionalized regulations expectedly are much less effective than targeted actions: in half a year after the law came into force just 369 people got registered with Roskomnadzor (Rothrock 2015) and the only known real consequence is the shut down of Intel’s forum for developers – hardly a platform of political significance, which was closed by Intel voluntarily out of precaution (Lunden 2015). Among the reasons is unclear definition of “readership”: Roskomnadzor guidelines on the subject⁷¹ call to use rigorous “page views” count (rather than hits, number of friends or followers or any other metric), but not all platforms generate such statistics, and it is especially hard to do in social networks.

Using loyal business groups to restructure the online media market proved much more reliable tool to ensure that at least Russian major platforms are under control. Hitherto mostly focused on traditional media (TV and press), power brokers in the Presidential Administration, Ministry of Communications and largest media conglomerates have been increasingly preoccupied with online news outlets and platforms. The methods they used were not much different. Two cases are particularly revealing. In 2014 billionaire Alexander Mamut fired the editor-in-chief of the most popular Russian online news portal *Lenta.ru*, allegedly on the grounds of insufficiently “pro-Russian” coverage of the Ukrainian revolution of 2013-2014. Complete lock out of the entire editorial staff was strikingly similar to the one at the NTV channel in 2001 and countless others since then. However – and here comes the difference between TV and website – this fired team of journalists was able to relaunch their media. The insurance of their independence and security from outside pressure was physical relocation of most of the editorial staff to neighboring Baltic country of Latvia and opening website in *.io* domain zone, which belongs to British Indian Ocean Territory and is administered by a UK

⁷⁰According to the survey reported by Alexanyan et al. (2012), even without any legal requirement Russian bloggers rarely conceal their identity. They do use pseudonyms (following internet tradition), but usually alongside, not instead of their real names. This is particularly true for politically-engaged bloggers.

⁷¹http://rkn.gov.ru/docs/prikaz_Roskomnadzora_ot_09.07.2014_N_99.pdf

company. New media name *Meduza* (Russian for jellyfish) matches the geographical location of its domain.

The hostile takeover of Vkontakte in 2013-2014 by Kremlin-affiliated businessmen also followed the approach which earlier successfully secured the loyalty of various media outlets (such as *Izvestia* and *Kommersant*): involuntary ownership transfer, usually, compensated at the market rate (dependent on the cooperation of the former owner). This transfer usually came after former owners and/or managers refuse to cooperate in politically sensitive matters for too long. Vkontakte received requests from FSB similar to the ones described (and followed) in case of pro-Navalny rally in late 2014 for years. Specifically, requests to remove pro-Navalny groups came first in the wake of large-scale protests after Duma elections in 2011 (Razumovskaya 2011), but Vkontakte owner and CEO, libertarian internet-guru Pavel Durov refused to comply. However, when in early 2014 Vkontakte was served with request to disclosure personal data of administrators of Euromaidan-related pages in Vkontakte ⁷², government did not take no for an answer. Durov had to sell what was left of his share, resigned and left the country (Ries 2014; Kononov 2014; Lunden 2014).

The lesson of Vkontakte was taken seriously not only by Russian media managers and owners, who wanted to keep their positions and businesses. Foreign companies which wanted to be able to refuse involuntary cooperation with Russian government had to assess if they had any vulnerable assets in Russia. For instance, Facebook ability to change its response and refuse to block any more groups in late 2014 episode of pro-Navalny rally was secured by company's retreat from Russia. Its development office was closed and the entire engineering team was invited (and accepted the offer) to move to Google offices in Europe and elsewhere. While reasons for this move were not disclosed, observers assumed company concerns with the potential access to Google code to the Russian government and even coercive methods to get this access through pressure on individual engineers (Bershidsky 2014).

⁷²https://vk.com/wall1_45621.

What in this context happened with the online response? Did response offline and through the online infrastructure supplanted any serious engagement with users on behalf of the government? Yes, but it was not the only factor. Another key change was in the target audience of government online effort. If Medvedev was trying to build a coalition around values of modernization and reformist policy agenda, “Putin Redux” entailed rather dramatic change in regime ideology, not just compared to Medvedev years, but also compared to Putin’s first two terms (Sakwa 2014). Reorientation towards conservative, even traditionalist values in domestic policy was paired with expansionist, revanchist foreign policy (Smyth and Soboleva 2014; Snyder 2014). This change had implications of truly historical scale, but one of less known consequences was reorientation of online propaganda machine from winning over neutral or even already oppositionally-inclined users towards protecting wider public, those receiving most of news news from TV but starting to use internet for entertainment or consumption, from the dangerous influence of the opposition voices. Typical example from the same episode with pro-Navalny rally in late 2014 was Youtube videos with prominent Navalny supporters, who were showing on air the web address of the supposedly pro-Navalny website with information about the rally. In reality they were fooled and the address was leading to page full of anti-Navalny videos. These videos and apparent endorsement of them by famous artists and journalist were then promoted on social media.

Such provocations obviously could not build a reputation that Medvedev, or his economic advisor Arkady Dvorkovich, or Perm governor in 2004 – 2012 Oleg Chirkunov were seeking to build online. Their goal is not to engage, agitate and invite for discussion; it is to disorganize, discourage and mute opposition. And this goal is much better served by filtering technologies and targeted prosecution of influential bloggers. Extensive online debates between oppositional politicians and pro-Putin “Nashi” youth movement, which occasionally happened before 2012, are no longer possible. With the gradual, but persistent political retreat of Medvedev’s team, and government officials of liberal and pro-Western inclination in general (which in many cases includes leaving public service or even the country for good), the government presence online would not vanish. However the government officials and their

speakers, both paid and volunteers, would speak with themselves and their most loyal supporters. Government would be online, but it would not be responding to anybody online, much less waiting for response from anyone.

Appendix C Classifying Twitter Accounts

For all accounts, the first order of business was to check if it features some meaningful content or it exclusively contains advertisement and/or gibberish. These accounts mostly feature various kinds of **spam** links (sales coupons, lottery, etc), pictures of consumer products and instant earnings ads. Sometimes, they switch to feeds of spam links in other languages.

If an account features meaningful content, coders first checked whether it is an *official* account for an organization. As institutional accounts are qualitatively different from accounts that individual people run (for example, they have larger content volume), we put them in a separate category. Both public and private account holders belong to this category. In our collection, these accounts usually belong to the news media. Note that we put only official accounts⁷³ in this category: if a bot features the same news feed as a news agency, it would be classified as a bot, not as an official account.

If an account belongs neither to spam nor to official institutional accounts, the goal was to classify it most reliably as human or bot. We proceeded by developing a comprehensive and empirically motivated classification scheme that would allow assigning unambiguously each account of interest to a category.

First, we checked how diverse is the account content. Some accounts feature one and only type of content, thus indicating bot activity. It could be just few hundred or millions of tweets, but all of them are identical in their form. For example, this could be easily identifiable **news headlines** (“President to visit China Tuesday”), posted one after another without tweets of any other kind. Alternatively, it could be only **retweets** from other Tweeter accounts, or just **pictures**, or just **videos**. In this case, the substantial content of the tweets does not matter: pictures could be from tennis events, videos from theater performances in Saint-Petersburg and news headlines about agriculture in the U. S. What matters here is that these are not tweets written by a human being, but posted by a robot, likely querying the web or feeding

⁷³But not necessarily verified as such by Twitter.

content from a pre-prepared RSS feed. The only exception to this rule are retweets: they can feature different content, produced by both bots and humans. Here the decisive factor is the absence of content actually posted by the user in question, as well as consistency and volume of retweets: few humans maintain Tweeter accounts featuring exclusively retweets from others, but even those who do could rarely demonstrate the dedication to the task exhibited by bots.

News headlines are further distinguished into those **containing a link** to a news website (it could be both the real source of news, like a major newspaper, and makeshift website that simply republishes content taken from elsewhere) and those **without any links**. The last group that belongs to this category are accounts posting *text* that does not come from the news headlines, but clearly is not generated by the account holder either. For instance, feeds entirely consisting of famous quotes from historical figures belong to this category.

The most challenging classification task arises in cases when the account features **diverse** content. First group in this category are accounts that may contain retweets, pictures, videos and text, but clearly do not contain anything that is not available elsewhere on the web and thus is not personally produced by the account holder. These could be pictures from a news agency, alternating with retweets, alternating with links to news stories or unidentified quotes from other blogs and twitter feeds. If in doubt about the latter, coders were instructed to google a chunk of text from a randomly chosen tweet to check if it was available elsewhere on the Internet.

All of the account types we mentioned above usually exhibit a level of content consistency so high that one can spot bot activity even without paying close attention to the content of the tweets: multiple links that lead to the same news website; pictures of the identical size posted one after another and never featuring a person unfamiliar to the general public, etc. Naturally, the first encounter with human content comes when the consistent pattern is broken. For instance, take a Twitter feed consisting of many retweets featuring similar content, such as pictures of Ukrainian soldiers allegedly killing civilians in the most brutal

way possible. But occasionally something different is popping up: a reply to another user, wishing her a nice morning, or lamenting about bad weather. Googling this content confirms that it could not be found, at least easily, elsewhere. If such kind of content is sparsely dispersed between many similar tweets clearly lifted from elsewhere, we are likely dealing with a bot manually maintained by (a team of) supervisors, who occasionally tweet by simply writing a real reply to another user (who could be both a real person and another bot). We classify this account as **cyborg**. We believe that this tactics is used to avoid Twitter spam filters as well as to increase the so-called account reputation (a computed characteristic of a Twitter account that might increase its visibility inside and outside the Twitter network).

Importantly, we clearly distinguish between trolls and cyborgs. Trolls are human beings dedicated (because of their persuasion, for money or out of fun) to spreading a particular kind of message online. We classify them, together with perfectly “normal” individual users into **personal accounts**. A different kind of human account is a feed featuring links to user’s online presence elsewhere. For example, one might want to post links to her Instagram pictures or Facebook posts. We call such accounts **translations**. Finally, sometimes a small group of people maintain a community, for example, with local news or dedicated to a particular artist. It is a rare case on Twitter, but for such cases we keep the **community** category.

Therefore, the coding schema for our verification effort is as follows (terminal categories are in bold):

1. **Official institutional accounts**
2. Bots
 - (a) Single-content
 - i. **Retweets**
 - ii. **Pictures**
 - iii. **Videos**
 - iv. Text
 - A. News headlines
 - **Text with links**
 - **Text without links**

B. Other text

(b) **Diverse content**

3. **Cyborgs**

4. **Humans**

(a) *Translations*

(b) **Personal accounts**

(c) **Communities**

5. **Spam**