Work in Progress
Source: http://cccp.narod.ru/graph/foto/plakat/staliniana/radost.jpg
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How Autocrats Manipulate Economic News: Evidence from Russia's State-Controlled Television
(Co-authored with Arturas Rozenas) Under review Conventional wisdom says that autocrats manipulate news through censorship. We argue that when it comes to economic affairs, the state's ability to censor information effectively is limited. Instead of censoring economic facts, the media tactically frames those facts to make the government appear as a competent economic manager. Using a corpus of daily news reports from Russia's largest state-owned television network, we document extensive evidence supporting this argument: bad news is not censored, but it is systematically blamed on external factors, whereas good news is systematically attributed to domestic politicians. This selective attribution is used to improve the government's reputation in politically sensitive times, but it is also employed as a pandering tool by the media. |
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Detecting Bots on Russian Political Twitter (Co-authored with Sergey Sanovich, Richard Bonneau, and Joshua A. Tucker) Under review Automated and semi-automated Twitter accounts, bots, have recently gained a large amount of public attention due to their potential interference in the political realm. Here we develop a methodology for detecting bots on Twitter using an ensemble of classifiers and apply it to study bot activity within political discussions in the Russian Twittersphere. We focus on the interval from February 2014 to December 2015, an especially eventful and consequential period in Russian politics. We find that up to 40% of actively tweeting accounts on Russian political Twitter were bots. We reveal bot characteristics that distinguish them from humans in this corpus, and find that the device used for tweeting is among the best predictors of bots. Finally, we show that the main activity that bots were involved in on Russian Twitter is the spread of news stories and promotion of media who produce them. Supplementary materials: Twitter snapshot example |
Source: http://www.jjrobots.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/robot-evolution-GIF.gif
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Source: https://fortypercentjourney.files.wordpress.com
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Government Strategies for Addressing Online Opposition in Russia
(Co-authored with Sergey Sanovich and Joshua A. Tucker) Under review Even though Internet and social media have been recently dubbed "liberation technology", there is growing evidence that non-democratic regimes have learned to use these tools for their own purposes including public opinion manipulation and agenda setting.
We introduce a novel classification of strategies employed by autocrats to combat online opposition generally, and opposition on social media in particular. We further illustrate different strategies with evidence from Russia since 2000. In addition, for the strategy that we call online engagement we construct the tools for detecting such activity on Twitter and test them on a large dataset of politically relevant Twitter data from Russia, gathered over a year and a half. We make preliminary conclusions about the prevalence of "bots'' in the Russian Twittersphere. |
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Recent research on the role of quasi-democratic institutions in non-democratic regimes finds differential effects of legislatures on economic performance and regime stability across subtypes of non-democracy. This empirically observed variation has however remained a "black box'" lacking a micro-theoretical foundation.
This paper helps bridge this gap by proposing a theory of two types of non-ruling parties (real and decoy opposition) that might be present in a non-democratic legislature and affect the way the legislature functions. I test behavioral implications of the theory using parliamentary speeches from the Russian legislature under Putin and show that, unlike decoy parties, real opposition strives to set the agenda on the floor of the parliament. I also show that decoy parties, unlike real opposition, avoid raising topics about the foundations of the regime, although they are trying to deceive voters by discussing weak points of the government. This variation in parties' strategies helps shed new light on the internal functioning of an autocratic legislature. |
Source: http://www.jantoo.com/
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Recent Publications
Source: http://www.e-reading.club/
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"King of the Mountain," Or Why Postcommunist Autocracies Have Bad Institutions
(2014) Russian Politics and Law 52 (2): 7-29 Co-authored with Andrei Melville and Mikhail Mironyuk We reconsider the relationship between democracy and state capacity in post-communist countries over the past two decades and question the general validity of the J-curve hypothesis. We also present informally our "king of the mountain" model explaining why autocrats have bad institutions in post-communist countries.
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Trajectories of Regime Transformation and Types of Stateness in Post-Communist Countries
(2014) Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14 (4): 431-459 Co-authored with Andrei Melville and Mikhail Mironyuk What types of factors are crucial for regime transformation in post-communist countries? We consider both structural and actor-oriented factors and find that the latter do a better job in explaining regime outcomes. We also examine post-communist stateness as another possible explanation for differences in regime transformations. We propose a vector measure of stateness which allows us to build a typology of stateness in post-communist countries that reveals the relationship between regime and stateness dynamics. We find that those post-communist states which fulfill a broad range of social functions are more successful in their democratic development.
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